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Mary Eaton* Lesbians, Gays and the Struggle
for Equality Rights: Reversing the
Progressive Hypothesis
I. Introduction
The tale often told of Canadian law's advancement in the field of sexual
orientation rights is simple but sublime: law has moved, however plod-
dingly and not without substantial prodding, out of an epoch of almost
total repression, into an evermore enlightened era. Castigated by criminal
law, pushed to the perimeter by administrative law, and ignored by human
rights law, the "homosexual"' had once been law's quintessential "other."
In recent years, however, legislatures and courts have increasingly been
willing to recognize "homosexuals" as a constituency too long held down
by the heavy hand of legal control. Most penal prohibitions against
exercises of same-sex sexuality have been lifted, several bureaucratic
marginalizations have been corrected, and the omissions of civil rights
legislation are at long last on the brink of being universally condemned.
The story enjoys special currency in the human rights arena. Here law has
been cast as awakening to the justice of acknowledging "homosexuals"
as a category of persons no less deserving of legal equality than other so-
called "minorities," and lawmakers are finally authorizing the enumera-
* I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to Sheila McIntrye for her inspiration, critical
commentary and unremitting support. Thanks are likewise due to Kathleen Lahey, Sheila
Noonan, Noel Lyon and Bruce Ryder for their input. My appreciation also extends to those
anonymous others who generously devoted their time and talent to review my essay. Support
for this research was provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and
Columbia University in the City of New York.
1. I do not use the term "homosexual" for two reasons. First, because of its origins as a
psychomedical concept developed in the late nineteenth century, I believe its use reinforces the
conceptualization of "homosexuality" as a disease, and the scientific penchant to treat its
occurrence as an objectifiable phenomenon to be studied, explained and (sometimes) cured or
curtailed. Apart from this, the word "homosexual" obscures the very real differences of
experience (and, therefore, oftentimes politics) that gender produces. My preference is for the
words "lesbian" and "gay" because I believe they respond well to both these concerns. I do
realize that they are not unproblematic: many lesbians think of themselves as "gay," and the
word "lesbian" has been criticized for its race-contingent lineage. Gloria Anzaldda has
suggested that we instead adopt the word "queer" (see "To(o) Queer the Writer-Loca,
escritoray chicana" inB. Warland, ed.,InVersions (Vancouver: Press Gang, 1991) 249). In my
view, like the homogenized term "homosexual," the word "queer" is wanting for its lack of
attention to gender. Unable to resolve this lexical dilemma, in this paper I mostly use "lesbian"
and "gay," although I sometimes use "queer," but I never use "homosexual" except in quotes.
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tion of "sexual orientation" as a prohibited ground of discrimination in
Canada's wide range of civil rights instruments. This narrative, astound-
ingly enough, has circulated across divergent schools of legal thought:
more or less the same story makes its appearance in the essentialized
tropes of liberal reformers and in the anti-essentialist terms of
poststructuralist radicals. One might refer to this chronicle of law's
inexorable evolution as the "progressive hypothesis."
Foucault's stance toward the form and function of law was somewhat
inconsistent but, given his general tendency to expel law from the force
field of discourse,2 slightly troubling for critical legal thinkers. Neverthe-
less, his critical insights into the "nature" of sexuality and the mode of
power in the modem era may assist in a re-reading of this rendition of
law's slow but steady progress in vindicating gay rights. Arguing against
the grain of prevalent accounts, Foucault theorized that "sexuality" was
not in fact a natural force or inclination inhering in individuals that came,
in Victorian times, to be suppressed through the forces, legal and
otherwise, of puritanical interdiction. Rather than the innocent victim of
the relentless machinations of the imperial prude, "sexuality" was manu-
factured as an interior truth by and incited into the open through
discourse, and more particularly, through the technique of the confession.
Thus, Foucault did not deny that repression of sexuality existed, but he
did insist that the "repressive hypothesis" was an incomplete account.'
The "progressive hypothesis," which celebrates the relentless
emancipatory progress of human rights law, and the textual grounding of
sexual orientation as an outlawed form of discrimination, is as susceptible
to reversal as the "repressive hypothesis" challenged by Foucault. Cer-
tainly, the enumeration of sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of
discrimination has made possible legal redress for certain inegalitarian
practices by creating the adjudicatory space for the recognition and
remedy of what often were admitted injustices. Yet the legal develop-
ments of recent years might be understood as more multivalent, carrying
both the negative charge of containment and the positive charge of
liberation. More specifically, the pledge to protect sexual minorities
came on the heels of and was followed by a discursive contouring of the
"homosexual" body and its tendencies.
In the first part of this paper, I shall detail how sexual orientation
reform was predicated on an already existing bifurcation between "ho-
2. For a review and discussion of Foucault's treatment of law see A. Hunt, "Foucault's
Expulsion of Law: Toward a Retrieval" (1992) 17 L. & Soc. Inquiry 1.
3. M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, vol. 1, trans. R. Hurley (New York:
Pantheon Books. 1976).
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mosexual" and other sorts of disempowered bodies. Early judicial opin-
ions denied that lesbian and gay litigants could, in the absence of
provisions specifically prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, lay legal claim to other human rights guarantees. "Homo-
sexuals" were thus stripped, as a matter of law, of those other elements
or characteristics that go into that constitutive mix loosely called "iden-
tity." Interned exclusively in the juridical category of "queer," they
became "homosexuals" without remainder. This confinement was usu-
ally achieved by means of a methodology of negative affirmation: in a
manner akin to Potter Stewart's oft-quoted sentiment that although he
could not define obscenity, he knew it when he saw it,4 judges confronted
with lesbian and gay litigants were seemingly content to rely on their own
normative understandings of what statutory guarantees against discrimi-
nation were meant to outlaw, and they could not and did not include
discrimination against lesbians and gays.
I shall show how the enumeration of sexual orientation, instead of
ushering in a new era of emancipation, actually made possible the
continued circumscription of the "homosexual" as a juridical subject.
Once the category "homosexual" was fashioned, the legal enunciation of
who was "homosexual," and what constituted discrimination on the basis
of a sexuality oriented toward same-sex desire, became necessary.
Hostile to the notion that heterosexual society should be at all curtailed
in its freedom to discriminate against "homosexuals," courts justified
denying equality claims on the footing that, as sexual deviants, lesbians
and gays were not the kind of group to which the law was obliged to
extend protection. In Canada, the success of the lobby effort to have
sexual orientation included in various human rights instruments did have
the effect of rendering this position legally untenable, but codification did
not prevent courts from persisting to delineate a space into which
"progressive" law would not enter. What demarcated the legally pro-
tected from the legally unprotected, the tolerable from the intolerable, 5
was so-called "homosexual" conduct. In other words, "sexual orienta-
tion" was interpreted in such a way that it would not insulate "homo-
sexual" practices from discrimination, but would only spare "homosexu-
4. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 at 197 (1964).
5. Bruce Rydermakes much the same argument. See "Equality Rights and Sexual Orientation.
Confronting Heterosexual Family Privilege" (1990) 9 Can. J. Fam. L. 39 at 43: "The manner
in which Canadian legislators and judges have responded to homosexuality can be understood
in terms of the compassion/condonation dichotomy." As will become clear, I part company
with Professor Ryder at the moment when the question of how to deal with the limits of liberal
toleration is broached.
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als" those inequalities born of antipathy towards "homosexual" "status"
or "orientation."
My method in making this argument also draws upon Foucault' s work,
particularly his notion of genealogy.6 The frame of my analysis is thus
temporally extensive. I undertake to provide a longitudinal history of
lesbian and gay claims to equality under various human rights instru-
ments since such efforts were first inaugurated. It is also spatially broad.
I refuse the notion that the discursive contours of lesbian and gay
oppression necessarily and neatly observe national boundaries, particu-
larly across borders separating western nations with similar histories and
comparable legal and political structures, and make critical use of the
experience of American lesbians and gays in their struggle to secure legal
protection against discrimination in analyzing the Canadian legal scene.7
It is this wider analytic framework that enables my claim that the story of
law's regulation of the rights of "homosexuals" cannot be reduced to a
tale either of unmitigated oppression or of steady but slow progress.
In the final part of my paper, I turn to the question of how litigants
might contend with the constraints law has imposed on the sexual
orientation field. I comment on how most strategies proposed in the
literature have failed to grasp that the legal construction of "homosexu-
ality" is premised upon a series of successive and inter-related contain-
ments, but my focus will be on common strategies deployed in the
litigation of equality rights under the rubric of sexual orientation. The
predominant effect of those strategies, as I shall show, has been to
reinforce rather than to challenge the construction of "homosexuals" as
a species dissectible into what they are and what they do. More specifi-
cally, I argue that both the positions most litigants have presented before
the courts and the being/doing distinction created and policed by judges
are grounded in a sameness/difference model of equality. Recent Su-
preme Court equality jurisprudence, inasmuch as it effected a shift in the
status of "difference" from being the register in which disentitlement to
equality is determined to being problematized as the mechanism by
which inequality is produced and maintained, may in fact provide a legal
mode for engaging the conduct/orientation distinction in a critical way.
6. M. Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" in P. Rabinow, ed., The Foucault Reader
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1984) 76.
7. To be sure, there is some connection between the national imaginary and the position of
sexual minorities within it, as the differential figuration of the AIDS-infected body in North
America and Africa, or of the citizen/soldier in Canada and the United States, demonstrates.
My point, then, is not that there are no meaningful distinctions between the production of the
"homosexual" under Canadian and American law, but only that none seem to be operative in
a definitive way in the particular context of equality rights at this precise moment in history.
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The question of "homosexual sex" is, under this new model of equality,
not one of "homosexual" difference but rather one of heterosexual
domination. My suggestion, then, is not simply that "homosexual" sex
should be spoken of-although I do think it should-but rather that law's
continuing circumscription of "homosexual" sex should be put squarely
in issue.
II. Lesbians, Gays and Equality Rights in Canada: A Historiography
Not until very recently have some Canadian jurisdictions statutorily
acknowledged sexual orientation as a prohibited form of discrimination.8
Before any Canadian human rights codes expressly proscribed discrimi-
nation on the basis of sexual orientation, lesbians9 and gays nonetheless
attempted to use human rights legislation to challenge discriminatory acts
and policies which operated to their detriment. Relying upon a variety of
other enumerated proscriptions against discrimination, challenges to
anti-lesbian and -gay practices were fashioned to conform with existing
law. All of the claims brought in this first phase of litigation, however,
were unsuccessful.10
Sex discrimination claims met dismissive responses by both courts
and human fights adjudicators alike. For example, in Board of Governors
of the University of Saskatchewan v. Saskatchewan Human Rights
Commission," a graduate student at the College of Education was
informed by the head of his department that he would no longer be
permitted to enter the public schools to supervise practice teaching
carried out by students of the College when it became known that he was
an out gay man who was attempting to establish an academic gay
association. 12 This decision was confirmed and supported by the dean of
the college and the president of the university.
8. See Quebec, Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-12, s. 10;
Manitoba, The Human Rights Code, S.M. 1987-88, c. 45, s. 9(2)(h); Yukon Territory, Human
RightsAct, R.S.Y. 1986 (Supp.), c. 11, s. 6(g); Ontario, Human Rights Code, 1981, S.O. 1981,
c. 53, s. 4(1) as am. by Equality Rights Statute Law Amendment Act, 1986, S.O. 1986, c. 64,
s. 18(5); Nova Scotia, Human Rights Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 214 as am. by S.N.S. 1991, c. 12.
9. Insofar as all of these cases were brought by gay men, or by mixed lesbian and gay groups,
it is only by extension that lesbians can be said to have participated in this early litigation.
10. Another case not discussed in this section was never decided because the complainant
died during litigation: see Damien v. Ontario Racing Commission (1975), 11 O.R. (2d) 489
(H.C.J.) andDamien v. Ontario Human Rights Commission (1976), 12 O.R. (2d) 262 (H.C.J.).
11. [1976] 3 W.W.R. 385 (Sask. Q.B.) [hereinafter University of Saskatchewan].
12. The complainant had placed an advertisement in a campus newspaper to get the
association off the ground. It was the publication of the ad that apparently prompted his removal
by the University authorities.
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The student, Mr. Wilson, complained to the Human Rights Commis-
sion that he had been discriminated against "because of his sex."13 As he
had "no control" 4 over his sexual orientation, Wilson maintained that to
discriminate against him on the basis of his "homosexuality" was
tantamount to sex discrimination because it was premised on an immu-
table sex characteristic. In granting the University's application for a writ
of prohibition preventing15 the Commission from dealing with Wilson's
complaint, Johnson J. held that the meaning of the word "sex," as it
appeared in the section of the Act, could not be extended to apply to
discrimination against "homosexuals":
In The Fair Employment Practices Act, the provision for prohibiting
employment discrimination against any person on the basis of his sex
would generally be considered to be on the basis of whether or not that
person was a man or woman, not on his sexual orientation, his sexual
proclivity or sexual activity. In other words, sex as used in s. 3 would
generally and popularly be regarded as referring to the gender of the
employee or prospective employee and not to the sexual activities or
propensities of that person.16
Later decisions confirmed that not only sex 17 but other statutorily
recognized heads of discrimination referred to relations between the
sexes and did not apply to "homosexuals" vis-h-vis heterosexuals. In
Vogel v. Government of Manitoba,5 for example, a claim that the denial
of employment benefits to the partner of a gay employee amounted to
discrimination on the basis of "marital status" was similarly rejected.
Acknowledging that the ManitobaAct did not define "marital status," and
13. Supranote 11 at386.
14. Ibid. at 390.
15. Two years later the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal stated that Johnson J. was wrong to
have stopped the Commission's inquiry. See Re CIP Paper Products Ltd. and Saskatchewan
Human Rights Commission (1978), 87 D.L.R. (3d) 609.
16. Supra note I 1 at 388-89.
17. Other instances in which charges of sex discrimination were levelled unsuccessfully
include Knodel v. British Columbia (Medical Services Commission) (1991), 58 B.C.L.R. (2d)
356 (S.C.) [hereinafterKnodel]; Egan v. Canada (1991), 87D.L.R. (4th) 320(F.C.T.D.); Vogel
v. Government of Manitoba (1983), 4 C.H.R.R. D/1654 (Man. Bd. Adj.) [hereinafter VogelI;
and Vogelv. Manitoba (No. 2) (1991), 16 C.H.R.R. D/233 (Man. Bd. Adj.) [hereinafter Vogel
(No. 2)], aff'd (sub nom. Vogel v. Manitoba) (1992), 16 C.H.R.R. D/242 (Man. Q.B.).
18. Ibid. See also Re North andMatheson (1974), 52 D.L.R. (3d) 280 (Man. Co. Ct.), where
an attempt by two gay men to have their marriage registered by provincial authorities was
rejected on the grounds that marriage could only take place between persons of the opposite
sex. See also Layland v. Ontario (Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations) (1993),
14 O.R. (3d) 658 (Div. Ct.), leave to appeal granted 7 June 1993 [hereinafter Layland]
(common law rule restricting availability of marriage to opposite sex couples does not infringe
constitutional equality rights of "homosexuals").
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in particular that, unlike similar provisions in other jurisdictions, 19 it did
not specifically restrict the meaning of the term to couples consisting of
partners of the opposite sex, the Board of Adjudication nonetheless found
that the term "impliedly only refers to heterosexual relationships,"2 and
concluded: "Mr. Vogel and Mr. North may live together but, in my
opinion, they do not do so in any legally recognized 'marital status'. "21
"Family status," a more unusual term in the human rights lexicon,22 has
also been interpreted as not applying to lesbian and gay relationships. In
Mossop v. Canada (Secretary of State), a translator for the Department
of the Secretary of State requested a day of bereavement leave, a benefit
provided to employees under a collective agreement between the Depart-
ment and Mossop's bargaining agent, to attend the funeral of his lover's
father. This request was denied by the employer on the footing that the
relevant article of the collective agreement only applied to persons of the
opposite sex, although it offered to allow Mr. Mossop the day off so long
as it counted as a vacation day. Dissatisfied with this offer, Mossop
launched a complaint under the Canadian Human Rights Act23
Although the tribunal appointed to hear Mr. Mossop's complaint
under the Act allowed the claim,24 its decision was subsequently quashed
by the Federal Court of Appeal on judicial review,' which decision in
turn was upheld by a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada.26 Marceau
J., writing for the majority of the Federal Court of Appeal,27 disagreed
with the tribunal that the phrase "family status" was flexible enough to
include same-sex couples:
I do not see how it can be said that the word "family" has a meaning so
uncertain, unclear and equivocal that, in a legal context, it must in every
instance be subjected to interpretation by the courts. Is it not to be
acknowledged that the basic concept signified by the word has always
been a group of individuals with common genes, common blood, common
ancestors. This basic concept lends itself to various degrees of extension
19. Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, s. 10(1) defines "marital status" as "the status
of being married, single, widowed, divorced or separated and includes the status of living with
a person of the opposite sex in a conjugal relationship outside marriage."
20. Supra note 18 at D/1657.
21. Ibid. atD/1658.
22. Manitoba and the Yukon are the only other jurisdictions that proscribe discrimination on
the basis of "family status." See The Human Rights Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. H175, s. 2(1); and
Human Rights Act, R.S.Y. 1986 (Supp.), c. 11, s. 6(k).
23. S.C. 1976-77, c. 33 (now R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6).
24. Mossop v. Canada (Secretary of State) (1989), 10 C.H.R.R. D/6064 (C.H.R.T.).
25. Canada (A.G.) v. Mossop (1990), 71 D.L.R. (4th) 661 (F.C.A.).
26. Canada (A.G.) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554 [hereinafter Mossop].
27. Technically speaking, Stone J. (Heald J. concurring) held the majority, although, with
respect to the issues discussed here, he endorsed the reasons of Marceau J.
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since the common ancestor may be chosen more or less remotely along the
line of generations and the group referred to today is generally seen as
including individuals connected by affinity or adoption, an inclusion
rendered normal by the fact that marriage was made the only socially
accepted way of extending and continuing the group, and adoption a
legally established imitation ofnatural filiation. Butthat does not affect the
core meaning conveyed by the word.'
He concluded that the "real"2 9 reason Mossop had been denied a day of
bereavement leave was because of his sexual orientation, not his family
status, a type of discrimination obviously not prohibited by the Act, and
granted the Attorney General's application to have the tribunal's decision
set aside.
The reasoning of Marceau J. was cited with approval by Lamer C.J.,30
who wrote the majority decision for the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice
reasoned that because Parliament had refused to add sexual orientation to
the list of prohibited grounds enumerated in section 3 of the Act, it was
evident that the legislature had not intended the words "family status" to
cover same-sex couples. La Forest J., by contrast, grounded his reasons
in the application of the plain meaning doctrine. He held that in "ordinary
parlance" the term "family" meant the "dominant" or "traditional"
conception of family, that is, the heterosexual family.31 Given that
Parliament had not evidenced an intention to depart from this accepted
meaning when it enacted the guarantee against family status discrimina-
tion, it was his view that Mr. Mossop's claim was rightly rejected.32
Unlike some of the other jurisdictions which specified the types of
discrimination prohibited by law, British Columbia had enacted a human
rights statute which made unlawful discrimination "without reasonable
28. Supra note 25 at 673.
29. Ibid. at 675.
30. Sopinka and Iacobucci JJ. concurred. La Forest J. wrote separate concurring reasons in
which Jacobucci J. also concurred.
31. Supra note 26 at 585-86.
32. For a more thorough review and critique of Mossop, see M. Eaton, "Patently Confused:
Compound Inequality and Canada v. Mossop" (1993-94) 1 Rev. Constit. Studies 203.
138 The Dalhousie Law Journal
cause."3 3 When a Vancouver lesbian and gay rights group was refused
permission to advertise the existence of its publication, Gay Tide, in a
western Canadian newspaper,34 the broad language of this anti-discrimi-
nation provision became the subject of one of the most notorious lesbian
and gay fights cases in Canadian history, Gay Alliance Toward Equality
v. Vancouver Sun.
The Board of Inquiry selected to hear Gay Alliance Toward Equality's
(GATE) discrimination complaint35 divided over the question of the real
reason behind the newspaper's actions, 36 but all members agreed that
there was no "reasonable cause" for its rejecting the ad and held that the
Sun had violated the Code. GATE's victory proved to be very short lived,
however, when the Vancouver Sun sought review of the decision in the
courts. By a majority of two to one, the British Columbia Court of Appeal
found that there was "reasonable cause" within the meaning of the statute
for the Sun's refusal to carry the ad and overturned the Board's decision.
Whereas Seaton J.A., thought that the Board's reasons were legally
sound, both of his colleagues felt that the Board had erred in law. Citing
the rights and sensibilities of members of majorities, Robertson J.A. held
that it was not the intention of the Code that these interests "be ignored
for the benefit of those who are different."37 Accordingly, it was his view
that the Board had crossed the proverbial line delimiting the function of
33. The Human Rights Code of British Columbia, S.B.C. 1973 (2d Sess.), c. 119, provided:
3(1) No person shall
(a) deny to any person or class of persons any accommodation, service, or
facility customarily available to the public; or
(b) discriminate against any person or class of persons with respect to any
accommodation, service, or facility customarily available to the public,
unless reasonable cause exists for such denial or discrimination.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1),
(a) the race, religion, colour, ancestry or place of origin of any person or class
of persons shall not constitute reasonable cause; and
(b) the sex of any person shall not constitute reasonable cause unless it relates
to the maintenance of public decency.
34. The text ofthe ad simply read: "Subs to GAYTIDE, gay lib paper$ 1.00 for 6issues. 2146
Yew St., Vancouver." The newspaper refused the ad, advising the person who submitted it that
the advertisement was "not acceptable for publication."
35. The reasons of the Board of Inquiry are reproduced in part in the opinion of the British
Columbia Court of Appeal in Re Vancouver Sun and Gay Alliance Toward Equality (1977),
77 D.L.R. (3d) 487.
36. The majority found that the newspaper's actions were motivated by a personal bias on the
part of management against homosexuals and homosexuality. Board Member Dorothy Smith,
dissenting, found that the Vancouver Sun's policy was predicated on a desire to protect
standards of decency and good taste (ibid. at 490).
37. Ibid. at 496.
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adjudicators and had, "by some quasi-legislative process"38 simply read
in coverage for "homosexuals" in apparent disregard for the terms of the
Code. Branca J.A., by contrast, felt that the critical question was whether
the newspaper's policy, even though motivated by bias, was reasonable.
Taking judicial notice of the social, religious and legal predisposition
against "homosexuals" and "homosexuality," he concluded:
I am of the opinion, that injustice, a bias motivated because of the belief
of some people that the homosexual engages in unnatural practice or that
their sexual practices are immoral or against religions does not make the
conclusion wrong, in the sense that it is unreasonable."
The issue whether "homosexuals" were entitled to protection under
open-ended statutes like the British Columbia Code40 was thus left less
than clear. The opportunity to provide guidance to both the lesbian and
gay and legal communities on this question presented itself in 1978 when
GATE was granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.41 In
what must surely be one of the great ironies of Canadian jurisprudence,
freedom of the press was invoked by the Supreme Court of Canada to read
into the plain language of a human rights statute permission for one
newspaper to suppress the publication of the existence of another news-
paper, the raison d'etre of which was the promotion of human rights.42
Strangely, the majority of the Court preferred to dispose of the appeal on
a ground that was not raised by either of theparties, and which was, in fact,
conceded by the newspaper at all levels of the dispute.43
38. Ibid. at 499.
39. Ibid. at 494.
40. Only Manitoba appears to still include the type of broad provision that was at issue in Gay
Alliance. The Human Rights Code, S.M. 1987-88, c. 45, C.C.S.M.c. H175, s. 9(1)(a) prohibits
"differential treatment of an individual on the basis of the individual's actual or presumed
membership in or association with some class or group of persons, rather than on the basis of
personal merit."
41. Gay Alliance Toward Equality v. Vancouver Sun (1979), 97 D.L.R. (3d) 577 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter Gay Alliance].
42. This irony is compounded when one observes that four members of the GATE majority
(Beetz with Martand, Ritchie and Pigeon JJ.) had decided one year earlier in Canada (A.G.)
v. Dupond (1978), 84 D.L.R. (3d) 420, that such fundamental rights as freedom of speech,
assembly and the press were not part of an implied Canadian Bill of Rights by virtue of the
preamble of the British NorthAmericaAct, 1867and were not "so enshrined in the Constitution
as to be above the reach of competent legislation" (ibid. at439). See on this pointJ. Richstone
&J.S. Russell, "Shutting the Gate: Gay Civil Rights and the Supreme Court of Canada" (198 1)
27 McGill L.J. 92 at 102, and W. Black, "Gay Alliance Toward Equality v. Vancouver Sun"
(1979) 17 Osgoode Hall L.J. 649 at 659-65.
43. See the opinion of Laskin C.J., supra note 41 at 590. See also on this point Richstone &
Russell, ibid., and H. Kopyto, "The GayAlliance Case Reconsidered" (1980) 18 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 639.
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For Martland J., the critical question was whether newspaper advertis-
ing facilities are services "customarily available to the public" within the
meaning of section 3 of the Code, the answer to which turned on the right
of freedom of the press, notwithstanding that, at least according to the
Chief Justice,' counsel for the Sun did not pursue freedom of the press
in its argument. Relying on American authority,45 Martland J. offered the
following mystifying analysis:
While there is no legislation in British Columbia in relation to freedom of
the press, similar to the First Amendment or to the Canadian Bill ofRights,
and while there is no attack made in this appeal on the constitutional
validity of the Human Rights Code, I think that Chief Justice Burger's
statement about editorial control and judgment in relation to a newspaper
is of assistance in considering one of the essential ingredients of freedom
of the press. The issue which arises in this appeal is as to whether s. 3 of
the Act is to be construed as purporting to limit that freedom.46
The law, Martland J. stated, recognizes the freedom of the press to
propagate opinions of their choice, to select what to publish and to reject
material contrary to their views. The Sun exercised that freedom when it
displayed a notice at the head of its classified section indicating that the
paper reserved the right to revise, edit, classify or reject any advertise-
ment submitted to it. Section 3 of the Code could not be interpreted to
dictate the scope of a newspaper's content, that is, to curb freedom of the
press. Accordingly, Martland J. found that, because the advertising
services of newspapers are services "customarily available to the public"
except insofar as they are subject to the right of the newspaper to control
ad content,47 the Sun had simply rejected the content of GATE's classified
and, thus, had not violated the Code.
Although the two dissenting opinions48 rejected some of the more
generally anti-egalitarian arguments advanced by the Sun and accepted
44. Supra note 41 at 585. Dickson J., conversely, stated that the Sun's counsel "strongly
contended for the traditional right of editorial control over newspaper content, including
advertising" (ibid. at 596).
45. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
46. Supra note 41 at 590. About this analysis Richstone & Russell, supra note 42 at 102, say:
"The reasoning of Martland J. is based solely on arguments neither raised, nor pursued in any
of the judgments a quo. This practice would seem to be at variance with actual procedures of
appellate courts, and contrary to the practice of the Supreme Court itself."
47. Supra note 41 at 591.
48. One was written by Laskin C.J., the other by Dickson J. in which Estey J. concurred.
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by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court majority,4 9 both focused
primarily on the Code's privative clause and held that the Court had no
power to reverse the Board's decision."
In failing to resolve squarely whether lesbians and gay men could
claim protection under open-ended human rights legislation, the Court
left an opening for future litigants to secure the rights GATE was denied.5 1
However, this possibility was extinguished in the Vogel case.52 In
addition to his double-barrelled argument that his employer had discrimi-
nated against him on the basis of both his sex and his marital status, Vogel
invoked the open-ended non-discrimination clause in the Manitoba
statute, a clause similar to the provision under the British Columbia Code
at issue in Gay Alliance. Unlike the situation facing the Supreme Court
in Gay Alliance, the claim as framed in Vogel left no room to avoid the
issue of whether such clauses applied to acts of sexual orientation
discrimination. The Board acknowledged that there was no clear author-
ity on the point, the opinions in Gay Alliance being divided with respect
to the substantive question of whether the no discrimination provision
applied to "homosexuals." Nonetheless the Board thought it proper to
49. Both dissents rejected the Sun's argument that, because running the ad might cost it
subscribers, such projected loss of business constituted "reasonable cause" for rejecting
GATE's ad. Laskin C.J. held that if a threatened loss of [bigoted] customers could justify
discrimination, the Code's protections could be "destroyed" not just for associations like
GATE, but for all historically discriminated against groups. Dickson J., by contrast, considered
the argument untimely insofar as it was first advanced at the Supreme Court. To credit it would
require the Court to make new findings of fact.
The two dissenting judgments also rejected, as the majority did not, the Sun's argument that
the Code only proscribed discrimination against individuals seeking access to public services
based on the personal traits of such individuals, but permitted discrimination, however
unreasonable, against the class to which they belonged.
Finally, both dissents categorically rejected Branca J.A.'s holding that "honest biases"
provide reasonable cause for discrimination. Such a ruling, both stated, would eviscerate the
Code and its underlying policy by insulating public services and institutions from human rights
law.
50. The decision of the tribunal was protected by a privative clause and some felt that the
Court of Appeal had overstepped permissible bounds by basically deciding the case anew
instead of reviewing itforjurisdictional error. See Kopyto, supra note 43; Richstone & Russell,
supra note 42; and R.A. Goreham, "Comment" (1981) 59 Can. Bar Rev. 165.
51. Asa point ofhistorical interest, after GATE's defeat before the Supreme Court ofCanada,
the British Columbia Human Rights Commission urged that s. 3 of the Code, along with s. 8
(covering discrimination in employment) and s. 9 (dealing with discrimination by employee
and employer organizations) be amended to include the words "sexual orientation." See
Human Rights Commission of British Columbia, I'm Okay; We're Not So Sure About You
(Victoria: Queen's Printer forBritish Columbia, 1983) at54. The British Columbia statute was
indeed amended, but in a way that served to solidify the exclusion of lesbians and gays from
the Code's reach. Not only was sexual orientation not added as a proscribed ground of
discrimination, but the open ended language of the statute was deleted.
52. Supra note 17.
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construe the provision narrowly. The adjudicator reasoned that, in light
of the controversy surrounding the Gay Alliance decision, the legislature
must have been aware of the case. Had it intended the statute to apply to
"homosexuals," he went on, the legislature would have unambiguously
spelled that out in the statute itself.
If ever there were any doubt about the scope of human rights for
lesbians and gays in Canada, the early litigation certainly put the debate
to rest: there was none. Undoubtedly because then extant categories of
legally recognized forms of discrimination were construed as water-tight
compartments which did not cover discrimination against lesbians and
gays, reform energies were galvanized toward securing the inclusion of
sexual orientation as an explicitly prohibited ground of discrimination in
human rights instruments. In some jurisdictions, these lobbying efforts
were successful and several legislatures agreed to amend their human
rights codes.53 In addition, although lobbying efforts to include sexual
orientation as an enumerated ground in section 15 of the Charter were
unsuccessful,54 there was a general consensus that the inclusive language
of the section would be interpreted broadly to apply to unenumerated
grounds, including sexual orientation. 5
In view of these statutory reforms and the promise of section 15,
lesbians and gays again took to the courts in search of legal equality. A
few actions were brought claiming violation of statutory provisions
expressly prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation,56 but
most57 invoked the open-ended language of section 15 claiming consti-
53. See ibid.
54. See A. Bruner, "Sexual Orientation and Equality Rights" in A.F. Bayefsky & M. Eberts,
eds., Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell,
1985) 457 at 464, and M. Leopold & W. King, "Compulsory Heterosexuality, Lesbians and the
Law: The Case for Constitutional Protection" (1985) 1 C.J.W.L. 163.
55. See Bruner, ibid.; Leopold & King, ibid.; Ryder, supra note 5; J. Jefferson, "Gay Rights
and the Charter" (1985) 43 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 70; andM. Eaton, "Lesbians and theLaw" in S.D.
Stone, ed., Lesbians in Canada (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1990) 109.
56. It is worth noting that, judging from the reported decisions, only the Manitoba, Ontario
and Quebec guarantees have been invoked thus far and so it remains to be seen how litigants
will fare in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and the Yukon.
57. A great many of the Charter cases have been spousal or family claims. Those that have
involved other matters, such as discharge from the military, never reached the substantive
discrimination issue, either because the case was settled out of court or because the dispute was
resolved on other grounds. See Brown v. Minister of Health (1990), 66 D.L.R. (4th) 444
(B.C.S.C.); Stiles v. Canada (A.G.) (1986), 3 F.T.R. 234 and (1986), 2 F.T.R. 173; Sylvestre
v. Canada (1986), 23 C.R.R. 313 (F.C.A.), rev'g [1984] 2 F.C. 516 (T.D.); Bordeleau v.
Canada (1989), 32 F.T.R. 21.
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tutional protection from anti-lesbian and -gay laws and state policies. 8
Even with statutory and constitutional changes ostensibly more hospi-
table to sexual orientation claims, the vast majority of these challenges
proved unsuccessful.
This seeming climate of toleration has not, for instance, altered
adjudicators' persistence in defining spousal or family relationships in a
heterosexually exclusive way, no matter what the sort of instrument
under which these kind of claims have been made. In Anderson v.
Luoma,59 for instance, two women had lived together for a number of
years, commingled their assets, and had had children together by alterna-
tive fertilization. When the couple broke up, one of the women sued under
provincial family law legislation for division of property and support for
herself and her children. Dohm J. held that the plaintiff could not rely on
the Family Relations Act" to support her position, for the Act did not
purport to affect the legal responsibilities which homosexuals may have to
each other or to children born to one of them as a result of artificial
insemination. The Act's application is, in general, directed to the spousal
and parental relations of men and women in their role of husband, wife and
parent.
6
'
Perhaps anticipating this unreceptive response, counsel argued that, if
applied only in this exclusionary way, the Act infringed section 15 of the
Charter. Dohm J. dealt with the constitutional issue perfunctorily, saying
in one line that any violation would certainly be justified under section 1.
Unlike Dohm J.'s curt dismissal of the constitutional argument in
Anderson, a more sophisticated approach to Charter interpretation and
application was evidenced in Andrews v. Ontario (Minister of Health),6
where a challenge was launched against Ontario's state-supported hospi-
tal insurance scheme. Karen Andrews wished to have her lesbian partner
treated as a dependent under the Health Insurance Act,63 but was denied
58. Mossop, discussed in the text accompanying notes 23-32, also appears in this period,
although the case was brought under a statute that contained no sexual orientation clause.
Presumably Mossop believed that in the post-Charter era, tribunals and courts would be more
receptive to his argument.
59. (1986), 50 R.F.L. (2d) 127 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter Anderson].
60. R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121.
61. Supra note 59 at 140, quoting the words of Wallace J. dismissing an application by the
same woman for interim relief [reported at (1984), 42 R.F.L. (2d) 444 at 446-47 (B.C.S.C.)].
It is noteworthy that Dohm J. also dismissed the plaintiffs common law claims for mainte-
nance and support, although he did allow a division of some of the assets under the doctrine
of constructive trust developed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Petkus v. Becker, [1980]
2 S.C.R. 834.
62. (1988), 64 O.R. (2d) 258 (H.C.J.).
63. R.S.O. 1980, c. 197.
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this benefit pursuant to regulations issued under thatAct, 4 where depen-
dents were defined, inter alia, as spouses.
McRae J. of the Ontario Supreme Court expressed profound doubt that
Ms. Andrews could, in the circumstances, claim the protections of section
15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In the alternative to
his main finding that Ms. Andrews had failed to establish a violation of
the equality provision, he went on to hold that whatever discrimination
she suffered was justified under section 1. In clear contradiction to
established Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on the evidentiary
onus in Charter cases,65 McRae J. ignored the province's failure to lead
evidence in support of upholding the regulation and held that the
restriction on Andrews' Charterrights was reasonable and demonstrably
justified by the state's interest in supporting "traditional" families.
Perhaps the most clear-cut instances of adjudicators engaging in the
same assiduous line drawing to define claims as falling outside the
guaranteed protections are the decisions in Re Carleton University and
C. U.P.E., Local 2424,66 and Vogel v. Manitoba (No. 2). In Carleton, a
contractual provision which specifically prohibited sexual orientation
discrimination was read down so as not to apply to domestic partnership
claims. Carleton, a gay man, sought to obtain benefits for his partner
under a collective agreement between his union and his employer which
made certain employment benefits available to the "spouses" of members
of the bargaining unit. The term "spouse" was defined in the agreement
as meaning "husband or wife in law or in common law." Mr. Carleton
filed a grievance claiming that the contract's definition of "spouse" was
itself discriminatory, and that the meaning to be given to the term should
be consistent with the non-discrimination provision.
But the Board of Arbitration disagreed. It held that the language in the
agreement was clear, and that if the term spouse was to include same-sex
partners, or if the parties had intended the non-discrimination clause to
override the codified definition of spouse, the parties could have and
64. R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 452, s. 1(c).
65. Section one of the Charter provides:
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 held that, once a Charter violation has been made out, it is
incumbent upon the party seeking to justify the infringement to demonstrate, by a preponder-
ance of cogent and persuasive evidence, that the infringement is reasonable and demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.
66. (1988), 35 L.A.C. (3d) 96 [hereinafter Carleton]; aff'd on judicial review (4 June 1990),
(Ont. Div. Ct) [unreported].
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should have said so in the contract. In support of its decision, it cited the
Ontario Human Rights Code, 1981,67 the structure of which paralleled the
collective agreement: it too defined "spouse" in a heterosexual way
notwithstanding that it also prohibited sexual orientation discrimination.
Although it was open to the Board to read the two provisions as being
consistent with one another, or to interpret the non-discrimination clause
in such a way that it would trump in those instances where it conflicted
with other articles of the agreement, it chose not to do S0 .6s Instead, and
without really offering any reasons,69 the Board held that the spousal
definition provision could not but prevail over the non-discrimination
provision, and accordingly dismissed the grievance. 70
Worse was the decision in Vogel (No. 2). 71 In 1987, the Manitoba
legislature repealed its Human Rights Act,72 enacting in its stead the
Human Rights Code.73 The new Code differed from the old Act in two
important respects. It included sexual orientation, along with sex, race,
marital status and other such characteristics, as a prohibited ground of
discrimination. As well, whereas the old Act contained a restrictive
definition of the meaning of "family status" discrimination, 74 the new
Code left the term undefined. Seeking to take advantage of these changes,
Richard North and his partner Chris Vogel renewed their challenge
against the Manitoba Government 75 for its failure to provide the couple
with several employee benefits afforded to married and common law
67. S.O., 1981,c. 53.
68. By this I mean that the Code's proscription against spousal discrimination could have
been "read down" to apply only to heterosexual spouses and not to limit the scope of the sexual
orientation equality guarantee.
69. It seems worth pointing out that the provisions of the Ontario Code which the Board of
Arbitration cited in support of its construction of the collective agreement had not been
interpreted at the time the grievance was decided. Indeed, although the Board claimed to have
been bound by the decision in Andrews v. Ontario (Minister of Health), supra note 62, McRae
J. expressly refrained from construing the provisions of the Code: "I do not intend, in this
application, to consider the provisions of the Ontario Human Rights Code, 1981, or to interpret
the applicants' rights under the Code" (supra note 67 at 264).
70. Tina Head, nominee for the union, dissented, but did not record written reasons for
doing so.
71. Supra note 17.
72. Human Rights Act, S.M. 1974, c. 65.
73. Human Rights Code, S.M. 1987-88, c. 45.
74. Specifically, s. 1(d.1) of the 1974 Act provided:
"family status" for the purposes of this Act includes the status of an unmarried person
or parent, a widow or widower or that of a person who is divorced or separated or the
status of the children, dependants, or members of a family of a person.
75. See text accompanying notes 18-21, 52. The pair also named the Manitoba Government
Employees' Association as a defendant.
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heterosexual couples. In addition to reiterating their sex and marital status
claims, they also complained that the benefits scheme discriminated
against them on the basis of family status and sexual orientation. The
Board of Adjudication noted that the addition of "sexual orientation" as
a prohibited ground of discrimination did not alter the meaning of the
guarantees against sex and marital status discrimination and dismissed
these complaints as an abuse of process. As to the "family status"
complaint, the Board reasoned that since "family" was by definition a
heterosexual institution, the repeal of the definition of "family status
discrimination" could be "attributed to redundancy,"76 and therefore it
was no violation of that provision to a adopt a benefits scheme that
privileged heterosexual over "homosexual" couples. And as to the sexual
orientation claim, the Board concluded:
Benefits are provided based upon whether employees are married as
defined in the various programs and whether employees have children.
The sexual orientation of the employee is irrelevant. A person may very
well be married to a person of the opposite sex and yet be homosexual. A
person may have children as contemplated in the employee benefit plans
and yet be homosexual. Similarly, a person may be heterosexual and yet
receive no benefit whatsoever either directly or indirectly from the
employee benefit plans because he or she is neither married nor has
children as contemplated in the plans. Accordingly, I have concluded that
the benefit plans do not discriminate based on sexual orientation.77
Despite the many ways in which the recognition of sexual orientation
as a prohibited ground of discrimination failed to deliver on its promise,
there were some victories. In L'Association A.D. G. Q. v. Catholic School
Commission ofMontreal,7 for example, the Quebec Superior Court ruled
that the School Commission had violated the Quebec Charter of Human
Rights and Freedoms when it refused to rent its facilities to a gay group
seeking to hold a weekend conference. In Veysey v. Correctional Service
of Canada,7 9 prison authorities were ordered to consider a gay inmate's
eligibility for participation in a family visiting programme on the same
basis as his heterosexual counterparts. In Knodel5 the Supreme Court of
76. Supra note 17 at D1240.
77. Ibid. The complainants unsuccessfully sought judicial review of the decision: Vogel v.
Manitoba (1992), 16 C.H.R.R. D/242 (Man. Q.B.). Upholding the reasonableness of the
Board's opinion, Hirschfield J. had occasion to comment: "The prohibited ground of discrimi-
nation because of sexual orientation does not, in my opinion, create a third gender for which
special legislative protection is either needed or to be granted" (ibid. at D/249). See also
Layland, supra note 18.
78. (1979), 112 D.L.R. (3d) 230 (Que. Sup. Ct.) [hereinafter L'Association A.D.G.Q.].
79. (1990), 109 N.R. 300 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter Veysey], affg on different grounds (1989), 29
F.T.R. 74 (F.T.D.).
80. Supra note 17.
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British Columbia issued a declaration that same-sex couples are spouses
for the purposes of province-run medical benefits. In Haig v. Canada,"
the federal government's failure to include sexual orientation as a
prohibited head of discrimination under section 3 of the Canadian
Human Rights Act was declared unconstitutional.
The decisions in L'Association A.D.G.Q., Veysey, Knodel, and Haig
have been a cause for celebration: not only did they bring some material
relief to the parties themselves, they also have symbolic importance for
both the litigants and the community at large. While I do not wish to
minimize the importance of the victories secured in these cases, a close
reading of the decisions reveals that some of them constitute neither
unqualified denunciations of discrimination against lesbians and gays
nor untempered declarations of their right to legal equality. Indeed, some
of the cases were decided on such narrow legal grounds that the weight
of their authority as precedent is somewhat questionable."z
In L'Association A.D.G.Q., for instance, the respondent urged the
court to follow the Gay Alliance decision and find that the School
Commission was entitled to refuse to rent its facilities to groups which it
found objectionable. Beauregard J. declined to do so, but distinguished
the case in a way which suggested that had the functional equivalent of
the newspaper's right to editorial control been asserted by the School
Commission prior to its dealings with the Association, the result might
well have been different:
81. (1991), 5 O.R. (3d) 245 (Gen. Div.) [hereinafterHaig], aff'd in part (1992), 16 C.H.R.R.
D1226 (Ont. C.A.). See also Waterman v. National Life Assurance Co. of Canada (No. 2)
(1993), 18 C.H.R.R. D/176 (Ont. Bd. Inq.) (discriminatory dismissal of "out" lesbian contrary
to Ontario Code); Leshner v. Ontario (No. 2) (1992), 16 C.H.R.R. D/184 (Ont. Bd. Inq.)
(restriction of definition of "marital status" to heterosexuals in Ontario Code unconstitutional
as offending s. 15 of the Charter); and Clinton v. Ontario Blue Cross (No. 2) (1993), 18
C.H.R.R. D1377 (Ont. Bd. Inq.) (restriction of availability of spousal benefits to heterosexuals
discriminatory on the basis of sexual orientation).
82. I cannot help but note that in several of the winning cases decided thus far, the courts were
presented with rather extraordinary fact situations. In Haig, ibid., one of the plaintiffs had
committed suicide before the litigation was completed. Similarly, in both Knodel, supra note
17, and Braschi v. StahlAssociates, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1989)-the one United States
case to recognize a gay familial claim-the plaintiffs were very sympathetic characters. Not
only was there nothing in the record of either case to suggest that their claim to spousal status
was a ruse or that their relationships were anything other than committed and sincere, but also,
the situations of both Mr. Braschi and Mr. Knodel were quite tragic in that both had lost their
lovers to a fatal disease. It remains to be seen, of course, whether these facts will prove
dispositive in litigation to come, distinguishing cases on their facts being a ready mechanism
to avoid the binding force of precedent, but certainly it does seem somewhat morbidly and sadly
significant that so many of the lesbian and gay claims that the law has so far recognized
involved plaintiffs who were no longer alive.
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The ratio decidendi of the Supreme Court case is that the Vancouver Sun
ordinarily offered advertising services to the public not in an absolute way
but reserving its right to control the content of the advertising. In the
present case, respondent offers the use of its buildings to the general public
reserving its right to control the nature of the activities carried out in its
buildings. But it has never reserved to itself the right to control the nature
or the content of the discussions which it permits within its buildings. 3
Similarly, Tim Veysey's right of access to the prison Family Visiting
Programme was affirmed in aper curiam decision of the Federal Court
of Appeal, but like the opinion in L'Association A.D. G. Q., the decision
signalled that a minor variation in the behaviour of the respondent might
well produce a different result in future cases. In its view, the language
of the Commissioner's Directive (and the booklet which accompanied it)
which described the programme was so broad that it could be construed
not to preclude the Commissioner, in his discretion, from permitting
Veysey to participate.' Variously describing the wording used in the
booklet as "novel," "ambiguous," "unusual," "special," "unique" and
"obviously not drafted by lawyers," 5 the court held that same-sex
partners fell within the definitional scope of the provisions:
In our view, the general wording of section 19 of the Directive-"this list
shall normally include relatives such as spouse, common law partner
... "--opens the door to applications by common law partners of the same
sex. "Relative" can be defined as "one who is connected with another or
others by blood or affinity"--(The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary,
Third Edition, at 1786), "a person connected with another by blood or
affinity," (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. at 1158), and "affinity" may
refer to "any close link or connection," "a strong liking or attraction
between one person and another," (The New Lexicon, Webster's Encyclo-
pedic Dictionary of the English Language, Canadian Edition, 1988, at 13).
Obviously, therefore, the use of the expression "relatives," when coupled
with that of the expression "common law partner," allows for an interpre-
tation of section 19 which goes beyond the traditional family circle. For
example, section 19 would make eligible persons such as uncles and
godfathers, even though they are not mentioned in the list.86
The decision, therefore, did not establish that Veysey and his partner
in particular or that same-sex couples in general are "spouses" nor indeed
that Veysey's Charter rights had been infringed.87 Instead, the court
83. Supra note 78 at 234. 1 should also note that Beauregard J. distinguished GayAlliance on
the additional footing that the Quebec Charter was different than the British Columbia Code
and that the case did not involve the principle of freedom of the press.
84. Supra note 79 at 303.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid. [emphasis in original].
87. Ibid.
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concluded only that the Commissioner had wrongly refused to exercise
his discretion in considering Veysey's application and ordered him to do
so. Notably, by grounding its decision on the wording of an internal
document, without the status of law, the court left it open to the prison
authorities to redraft the booklet with orthodox language to exclude
claimants like Veysey.
HI. The Theory and Practice of the Legal Subordination of Lesbians
and Gays: An Account
Recently, the federal government announced its proposal to make "sexual
orientation" a prohibited ground of discrimination under federal law.ss
The government's move was widely hailed by a variety of groups until it
was discovered that a companion provision exempting family rights19
also figured in the government's legislative plans. Reactions after the
disclosure of this information ranged from outraged protestations that the
government had reneged on its promises,90 to dismissal of the package of
proposals as almost worse than useless, to resigned acceptance that,
politics being the art of the possible, the government's compromise was
at least better than nothing.91
88. The announcement was made December 10, 1992 by then Minister of Justice and
Attorney General of Canada, the Honourable Kim Campbell.
89. The Bill included anew definition of marital status, couched in opposite sex terms (s. 10).
It also provided that it was no violation of the Act for separate pension funds or plans to be
established for different groups of employees provided those employees were not grouped
according to a prohibited ground of discrimination (s. 8).
90. Many of those who had pushed for inclusion of sexual orientation in theAct cited the fact
that an all-party parliamentary committee (popularly known as the Boyer Commission) had
recommended seven years earlier that such an amendment be implemented [Report of the
Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights: Equality for All (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
1985)]. Upon disclosure of the legislative plans, the Report's recommendations were invoked
as evidence of the government's lack of integrity. Unfortunately, these critics seemingly failed
to appreciate that the position embodied in the Bill was not at all inconsistent with the position
endorsed by the Boyer Commission. While the Report adopted a condemnatory attitude toward
the injustices done to lesbians and gays through the denial of their equality rights, it made
absolutely no mention of the spousal issue in its discussion. Likewise, in a separate chapter
dealing specifically with the issue of marital and family status discrimination, no reference was
made to the question of lesbian and gay couples.
91. Sheila McIntyre has pointed out to me that there is yet a third line of objection to the
government's proposal, one founded more in principle than in particular complaints about
family status and rights: that there is something unprincipled about the granting human rights
protection with one hand while taking some of it away with the other. I do not disagree, but
sense that this "principled" objection did not figure largely in popular reactions to the events
in question, at least as they were reported in the mainstream media. In any event, should I be
shown to be in error on this point, it would not detract from my analysis which follows.
150 The Dalhousie Law Journal
This last response arguably recognized that the government was
simply attempting to codify existing law. The family provisions did not
alter the common law position that protection against discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation, whether express or implied, does not
entitle lesbian and gay couples to the same kinds of privileges and
benefits accorded heterosexual unions. But what seems to have been
overlooked both by those who denounced the government's proposed
amendments in toto and by those who were prepared to swallow the bitter
pill of political compromise is that, by locating the source of the problem
in the family provisions rather than the sexual orientation clause, they
assumed that there was nothing per se problematic about the use of the
words sexual orientation or their addition to the Act. Problematic enough
was their implicit assumption that all lesbians and gays want to be
counted as family, though of course some do, but worse still was the
equally implicit assumption that the protection of the rights of unpaired
lesbians and gays (or rights which are unlinked to couple issues) was
somehow not at issue.
While the addition of sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of
discrimination has made possible a few legal victories, they have been so
random and/or qualified that it is difficult to say with much confidence
that they represent a positive trend. Perhaps because of the rather less than
stellar track record of the courts on the issue of equality rights for lesbians
and gays, thinking about why most litigation has failed so dismally has
not evolved very far beyond bald accusations of judicial homophobia. I
do not doubt that "homophobia" or "heterosexism ' '92 has figured in the
near consistent denial of legal entitlement to equality for lesbians and
gays. Nevertheless, I do think that the charge that the courts are biased is
rather lacking as an account of what has transpired to date in litigation,
and none too inspiring in terms of providing a foundation for a manifesto
for action in the future. A more sophisticated model for accounting for
heterosexual hegemony in the legal sphere is required if it is ever to be
effectively challenged.
92. I myself prefer not to use the word "homophobia" because I think it wrongly implies that
the oppression of lesbians and gays is grounded in fear rather than hatred. See, for example, G.
Kinsman, The Regulation of Desire (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1987) at 28-29, and the
sources cited in R.B. Mison, "Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as
Insufficient Provocation" (1992) 80 Cal. L. Rev. 133, n. 103. "Heterosexism" comes closer to
describing lesbian and gay oppression, conveying, as it does, the notion that such subordination
is systemic and institutionalized. Something analogous to the term "misogyny" (meaning
hatred of women) would best capture the nature and function of the specific social relation I
have mind, but unfortunately, no such word yet exists.
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The parallels between the course of sexual orientation litigation in the
United States and Canada are striking.93 In the absence of explicit
legislative protection against sexual orientation discrimination, for in-
stance, American lesbians and gays similarly sought to take advantage of
existing equality guarantees in federal and state human rights instruments
to challenge discriminatory policies and practices. These attempts like-
wise attracted little judicial approbation. For example, a gay male couple
that had been denied a marriage licence challenged the decision under the
sex equality guarantee contained in Washington's state constitution, but
to no avail. 94 Title VIl's prohibition against sex discrimination was
invoked unsuccessfully both by a gay man who had been fired from his
job because he was gay95 and by a man who had been refused a position
because he exhibited "effeminate" characteristics.96 Guarantees against
marital status discrimination also proved of no assistance.97 Like their
Canadian counterparts, members of the American judiciary rejected
these attempts to incorporate sexual orientation claims under other heads
of discrimination, and by means of similar interpretive methods: the
equality guarantees contained in state and federal civil rights instruments
were narrowly construed, their scope circumscribed by reference to
legislative intent and popular, "plain" meanings of contested language.
Whereas in the early years in Canada the only place to turn in the face
of defeat was the political arena, in the United States the possibility of
turning to the constitution for assistance was always open, and American
litigants did not hesitate to challenge anti-lesbian and -gay laws and
policies on constitutional grounds. In consequence, there is now a fairly
developedjurisprudence on the scope of protection that the constitutional
guarantee of equality-the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
93. I acknowledge that there are dangers in relying upon American jurisprudence, especially
since the Supreme Court of Canada has specifically refrained from following American
constitutional precedent on more than one occasion. See, e.g., Reference Re Section 94(2) of
the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1979 (1985), 24 D.L.R. (4th) 536 (s. 7); and McKinney v.
UniversityofGuelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 [hereinafterMcKinney] (s. 32). Suchjurisprudential
differences are not particularly germane to my argument at this point, although they will
become so later.
94. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) [hereinafter Singer].
95. DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
96. Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978). See also Holloway
v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977) (refusal to hire transsexual not sex
discrimination).
97. Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Commission, 482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992)
[hereinafter Phillips] (employer's denial of family health insurance coverage to lesbian partner
of employee not marital status discrimination within the meaning of the Wisconsin Fair
Employment Act, Wis. Stat. § 111.321 (1992)).
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Amendment 9-has to offer, a jurisprudence under which the politics of
sexual orientation law has become quite explicit.
While strategists considered a number of constitutional provisions in
the quest to secure some legal protection for lesbians and gays, more than
any other guarantee, the right to privacy seemed to attract the most
support. In part this undoubtedly had to do with the strong line of
authority dealing with the right to privacy established by the United
States Supreme Court in several landmark cases. It seemed logical to
suppose that if decisions concerning abortion,99 birth control"' and
marriage 01 were constitutionally beyond the power of government to
restrict, so too would be decisions-concerning an individual's sexuality.
As an academic matter, the promise of privacy appeared very full
indeed.l12 Not surprisingly, therefore, the first "gay rights case" to reach
the United States Supreme Court was argued on privacy rather than equal
protection grounds.
After some debate in the lower courts whether existing jurisprudence
could legitimately be extended to cover private exercises of "homo-
sexual" sexuality, 10 3 the opportunity to settle the law arose when a gay
man named Michael Hardwick was arrested and charged with the crime
of sodomy for engaging in consensual sexual relations with another adult
man in the privacy of his own bedroom contrary to Georgia state law. 1 4
98. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part: "No State shall ...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
99. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
100. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972).
101. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
102. See, for example, K. Karst, "The Freedom of Intimate Association" (1980) 89 Yale L.J
624.
103. Some courts had held that the right to privacy did extend to private homosexual sexual
conduct: see, e.g., New York v. Onofre, 424 N.Y.S.2d 566 (App. Div. 1980) [hereinafter
Onofre]. Most courts thought otherwise (see, e.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F.
Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) and Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
[hereinafter Dronenburg]), but they attracted much critical commentary. See, for instance, H.
Pearlman, "Dronenburg v. Zech: Strict Construction or Abdication of Judicial Responsibility"
(1985) 12 Hastings Const. L.Q. 669, and R. Dworkin, "Law's Ambition for Itself' (1985) 71
Va. L. Rev. 173. But see A. Brooks, "Doe and Dronenburg: Sodomy Statutes Are Constitu-
tional" (1985) 26 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 645. Additionally, there was some question whether
the United State Supreme Court's summary affirmation in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,
96 S.Ct. 1489 related to the substantive or only the procedural issue at stake in the appeal: see
L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (Mineola, New York: Foundation Press, 1978) at 943.
104. Ga. Code Ann, § 16-6-2 (1984). For an excellent exegesis of the facts leading to and
surrounding the prosecution of Michael Hardwick, see K. Thomas, "Beyond the Privacy
Principle" (1992) 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1431.
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Though the charges against Mr. Hardwick were eventually dropped, he
was permitted to challenge the Georgia statute on constitutional grounds
because, technically, he remained in danger of prosecution. The federal
district court dismissed Hardwick's complaint, but this decision was
reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Johnson J., writing for the majority, held that the activity in which Mr.
Hardwick wished to engage was "quintessentially private" and lay "at the
heart of intimate association." 105 The state's petition for certiorari was
unexpectedly' 16 granted by the United States Supreme Court.
Although the facts and circumstances of Hardwick seemed near
perfect in terms of winning a privacy challenge, the Court dismissed
Hardwick's complaint, saying there could be no fundamental right to
engage in "homosexual" sodomy under the United States Constitution.
According to the majority, the protection of privacy extended only to
rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition,"'17 and, unlike the decision to marry or to
bear or beget a child, the assertion that "homosexual" sodomy satisfied
these preconditions was characterized as "at best, facetious."' s
Because Hardwick's claim was framed almost entirely in terms of
substantive due process principles, the equal protection implications of
the case were never seriously raisedt 9 and the Supreme Court failed to
give much indication of its views on this issue.110 The idea that the Equal
Protection Clause might be used to advance the civil liberties interests of
105. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 at 1204(1lth Cir. 1985).
106. Y. Apasu-Gbotsu et al., "Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context
of Homosexual Activity" (1986) 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 521.
107. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 at 2844 (1986) [hereinafter Hardivick] quoting
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 at 325 and Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 at 503.
108. Ibid. at 2846.
109. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 2d ed. (Mineola, New York: Foundation
Press, 1988) at 1431, n. 71. In fact, the equal protection issue was alluded to in a footnote of
the respondent's brief, but the Court obviously chose to regard the reference as parenthetical.
110. Both Justice Blackmun (Brennan, Marshall and Stevens JJ. concurring) and Justice
Stevens (Brennan and Marshall JJ. concurring) hinted that the Georgia provision violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Blackmun noted that although
the impugned statute was cast in gender-neutral terms, the State of Georgia had defended it by
stressing only its interest in criminalizing homosexual acts of sodomy, and that this raised
"serious questions of discriminatory enforcement" (supra note 107 at 2850, n. 2). He also
regarded the parallel between the criminalization of homosexual sodomy in Hardwick and the
criminalization of mixed-race marriage in Loving v. Virginia, 87 S. Ct. 1817 (1976) as
"uncanny" (supra note 107 at 2854, n. 5). In Loving, the Court struck down as racially
discriminatory a state anti-miscegenation statute. The miscegenation analogy was also noted
by Justice Stevens (ibid. at 2857, n. 9). The dissent's cryptic comments on Loving have been
more fully developed by A. Koppelman, "The Miscengenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex
Discrimination" (1988) 98 Yale L.J. 145.
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lesbians and gays was not unheard of. Indeed, by the time Hardwick was
decided, a number of cases had been litigated under this provision,"'
some of which even involved challenges to sodomy statutes. The defeat
of the privacy claim in Hardwick inspired renewed interest in the
111. Childers v. Dallas Police Department, 669 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1982), aff'g 513 F. Supp.
134 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army, 641 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981);
Rowlandv. MadRiverLocalSchoolDistrict, 105 S. Ct. 1373 (1985),perBrennan J. dissenting
from denial of cert.; Under2l v. City offNew York, 488 N.Y.S.2d 669 (App. Dep't 1985); Baker
v. Wade, 774 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1985), rehearing denied 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985);
Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980); National Gay Task Force v. Board of
Education of the City of Oklahoma City, 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter National
Gay Task Force]; and Onofre and Dronenburg both supra note 103. Some of the cases were
decided under the fundamental rights branch while others were decided under the suspect class
branch of the Equal Protection Clause. Under the fundamental rights branch, the Fourteenth
Amendment will be violated if the state singles out a group and denies them a fundamental
right: See Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 89 S.Ct. 1886 (1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 89 S.Ct. 1322 (1969); and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 62 S.Ct. 1110 (1942). Complain-
ants need not show themselves to be a member of a discrete and insular minority; state action
which singles out any group for the purpose of denying it a fundamental right always attracts
rigorous scrutiny. Under the suspect class branch of equal protection analysis, different levels
ofjudicial scrutiny attach to different classifications depending upon the characteristics of the
group. As explained by the Supreme Court in City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living
Centre, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985), the "general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and
will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest" (ibid. at 3254). However, when a state classifies by race, alienage or national
origin, strict scrutiny of the state action is justified because "[t]hese factors are so seldom
relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such
considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy" (ibid., citing McLaughlin v.
Florida, 85 S.Ct. 283 at 288 (1964) and Graham v. Richardson, 91 S.Ct. 1848 (1971)) and
because such discrimination "is unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means" (ibid.).
Legislative classifications based on gender are subject to a "heightened standard of review,"
requiring that the classification be substantially related to a sufficiently important government
interest in order to survive, because gender "generally provides no sensible ground for
differential treatment" (ibid.) and because classifications based on gender are "very likely to
reflect outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and women" (ibid. at 3255, citing
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982) and Craig v. Boren, 97 S.
Ct. 451 (1976)). For classifications based on grounds other than race, alienage, gender, et
cetera, the Supreme Court has developed the four criteria, listed infra, to assist in determining
whether heightened or strict scrutiny is justified.
Lesbians, Gays and the Struggle for Equality Rights
potential of the Fourteenth Amendment,' 12 but the promise of the equal
protection guarantee was never fully realized. The very ideology that
governed the loss in Hardwick also proved controlling in the anti-
discrimination context.
At issue in Padula v. Webster' was an FBI policy of considering
"homosexual" conduct a significant factor in employment decisions.
Margaret Padula applied for aposition as a special agent and ranked fairly
well on screening tests. Background checks, however, revealed that
Padula was a "practising homosexual" who, while she did not "flaunt" her
sexual orientation, was open and unembarrassed about it. When Padula
was unsuccessful in securing a position with the FBI, she filed suit
alleging that her right to equal protection had been denied.1 4
The FBI argued that its hiring policy focused only on "homosexual"
conduct and not on "homosexual" status. Padula countered with the
112. Paradigmatic of the academic literature in which the equal protection approach was
advocated is a note which appeared in the Southern California Law Review in 1984 (H. Miller
II, "An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifica-
tions Based on Homosexuality" (1984) 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 797). Relying upon the fourfold
criteria of suspectness, the author argued that historical, sociological and psychomedical
evidence demonstrated that homosexuals fit the Fourteenth Amendment notion of the kind of
group deserving of heightened scrutiny where laws single them out for discriminatory
treatment. There has, of course, been some dispute over what the criteria of suspectness are or
should be (see, for example, J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980) at 150ff) but at the same time there has been
general agreement amongst academics that some form of heightened scrutiny of anti-
homosexual laws is appropriate under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., E. Chaitin & R.
Lefcourt, "Is Gay Suspect?" (1973) 8 Lincoln L. Rev. 24; J. Friedman, "Constitutional and
Statutory Challenges to Discrimination in Employment Based on Sexual Orientation" (1979)
64 Iowa L. Rev. 525; Note, "The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual
Conduct" (1974) 72 Mich. L. Rev. 1613; J.W. Hawarth, "The Rights of Gay Prisoners: A
Challenge to Protective Custody" (1980) 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1225; Note, "Homosexuals' Right
to Marry: A Constitutional Test and A Legislative Solution" (1979) 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 193;
and D. Barnhardt, "Commonwealth v. Bonadio: Voluntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse-A
Comparative Analysis" (1981) 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 253. See also Note, "The Constitutional
Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality As A Suspect Classification" (1985) 98 Harv. L.
Rev. 1285.
In spite of the academic consensus that had been building on this point, the judiciary tended
to view the matter differently. Before 1987, not a single court was willing to recognize
homosexuals as a suspect or quasi-suspect class. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 94; People v.
Santibanez, 154 Cal. Rptr. 74 (Ct. App. 1979); National Gay TaskForce, supra note 111; Rich
v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Rich]; Baker v. Wade,
769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985); and In Re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21 (N.H. Sup. Ct.
1987).
113. 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Padula].
114. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is binding on the federal
government (and therefore the FBI as a federal state actor) as part of the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 74 S.Ct. 693 (1954), and Weinberger v.
IViesenfeld, 95 S.Ct. 1225 (1975).
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assertion that the distinction between "homosexual" conduct and orien-
tation was specious because "homosexual status is accorded to people
who engage in homosexual conduct, and people who engage in homo-
sexual conduct are accorded homosexual status."" 5 The court, however,
eschewed the idea that the distinction was relevant for the purposes of the
appeal since the policy, as framed, targeted "homosexuals" defined as
persons who engage in "homosexual" conduct: the only question was
whether practising "homosexuals" constituted a suspect or quasi-suspect
class. In spite of its claim that it was deciding only the narrow issue before
it, the court went on to pronounce on the status question anyway, citing
Bowers v. Hardwick"6 in support. In its view, Hardwick implicitly
answered the equal protection issue when it found that the Georgia
sodomy statute met the rational basis test. The court continued:
It would be quite anomalous, on its face, to declare status defined by
conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as deserving of strict
scrutiny under the equal protection clause.... If the Court was unwilling
to object to state laws that criminalize the behavior that defines the class,
it is hardly open to a lower court to conclude that state sponsored
discrimination against the class is invidious. After all, there can hardly be
more palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that
defines the class criminal. 117
The following year, the Ninth Circuit took a different and more
restrictive view of the Supreme Court's Hardwick decision. In Watkins
v. United StatesArmy,118 Perry Watkins, a longtime member of the forces,
was discharged on the basis that he was an admitted "homosexual."
Watkins had enlisted in the army in 1967. A pre-induction medical form
inquired whether he had any "homosexual" tendencies, which Watkins
answered in the affirmative. The army nevertheless found that he quali-
fied for admission and Watkins was subsequently inducted.
Eight years later in 1975, the army convened a board of officers to
determine whether Watkins should be discharged on the basis of his
"homosexual" tendencies. His commanding officer testifiedthat Watkins
was "the best clerk I have ever known," that he did a "fantastic job" and
that his "homosexuality" did not affect the company. The board unani-
mously decided that Watkins should be retained, as therewas no evidence
that "his behavior has had either a degrading effect upon unit perfor-
mance, morale or discipline, or upon his own job performance."119 In
115. Supra note 113 at 102.
116. Supra note 107.
117. 822F.2d97 at 103.
118. 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Watkins].
119. Ibid. at 1331.
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1977, Watkins applied for but was denied a position in the Nuclear Surety
Personnel Reliability Program because of his previous admission con-
cerning his sexual orientation. After Watkins' commanding officer
requested that he be re-qualified for the position, citing his excellent
qualifications, the decision to deny his application was reversed. Finally,
in 1979, Watkins' security clearance was revoked as a result of yet
another investigation into his sexual orientation. Nonetheless, Watkins
was permitted to remain in the armed services. When the army issued a
new regulation in 1981 mandating the discharge of all "homosexuals,"
regardless of the length or quality of their service, Watkins was finally
dismissed.
Watkins contested his discharge in federal court arguing that it
violated his right to the equal protection of the laws under the Fifth
Amendment."" The Ninth Circuit upheld Mr. Watkins' claim, finding
that the regulations under which he was discharged were unconstitutional
as primafacie discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation. Justice
Norris, writing for the majority, found that the regulations targeted
"homosexual" orientation in itself, and went far beyond proscriptions
against "homosexual" conduct. 2 1 He disagreed with the D.C. Circuit
ruling in Padula that the issue of "homosexual" status was determined in
Hardivick, and preferred to read the Supreme Court's decision more
narrowly as deciding only that same-sex sexual conduct fell outside the
purview of the Constitution.122 Since Watkins' dismissal was in fact
solely premised upon his admission of "homosexual" orientation, the
court found that the army had impermissibly discriminated against
him.1-3 In the result, Norris J. struck down the regulation and ordered the
Army to consider Watkins' application for re-enlistment without regard
to his sexual orientation.
A number of courts have had occasion to consider the divergent
opinions in Padula and Watkins. Various anti-gay and -lesbian provisions
have been subjected to judicial review, including the denial of prison
visits for same-sex partners, 124 and employment policies against the
120. See supra note 114.
121. In a footnote, Justice Norris explained that by "conduct" he was referring to sexual
activity, and by "orientation" a desire for such activity (supra note 118 at 1330, n. 1).
122. The Padula rationale was adopted by Judge Reinhardt in dissent (supra note 118 at
1354ff).
123. It is ofconsiderable note, however, that a rehearing was granted on the issue of whether
Watkins was really a psychologically committed, though celibate, homosexual, or whether he
had indeed been a practising homosexual at the relevant time. See Watkins v. United States
Army, 847 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1988).
124. Doe v. Sparks, 733 F.Supp. 227 (W.D. Pa. 1990)
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hiring or retention of "homosexuals" in the military and other like
employment contexts.1 5 Of the courts that have considered the issue,
only the district courts of Wisconsin and California followed the more
liberal Watkins approach, with both limiting the sphere of "conduct"
unprotected by the Equal Protection Clause. In BenShalom v. Marsh,
Justice Gordon read Hardwick as limiting the application of strict
scrutiny review to those classifications which fell below the level of
criminal sodomy.12 6 Justice Henderson came to a similar conclusion in
125. See, e.g., Todd v. Navarro, 698 F. Supp. 871 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Woodward v. United
States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Dubbs v. CIA, 866 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1989); Doe v.
Sparks, ibid.; and Steffan v. Cheney, 733 F. Supp. 121 (D.D.C. 1989), rev'd 920 F.2d 74 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (allegation that plaintiff had engaged in homosexual conduct never made).
126. BenShalom v. Marsh, 703 F.Supp. 1372 (E.D. Wis. 1989) [hereinafter BenShalom].
After reviewing the decisions in Hardwick and.Padula, Gordon J. concluded that they could
"only be reasonably construed as standing for the proposition that classifications are not subject
to strict scrutiny when defined by homosexual conduct that rises to the level of criminal
sodomy" (ibid. at 1379, citing Doe v. Casey,796 F.2d 1508 at 1522 (D.C. Cir. 1986)), aholding
which he admitted was reasonable (ibid. at 1380). But as to whether a distinction could
legitimately be drawn between status and conduct, Justice Gordon commented:
The Secretary has continuously characterized homosexuals as a group defined by the
desire and intent to engage in criminal acts of sodomy. Yet not one shred of evidence
has been presented to the court to show that homosexuals as a group share a compelling
desire to commit that particular form of sexual conduct. The court is asked by the
Secretary to hold that homosexual orientation is inherently intertwined with a desire and
intent to commit criminal acts of sodomy. To do so is to create a class based on
prejudicial notions of what homosexuals are supposedly like. (ibid. at 1379)
Homosexual status, he went on to find, did constitute a suspect class deserving of strict scrutiny.
Having established the appropriate standard of review, Justice Gordon examined the army's
regulation, found it constitutionally wanting, and struck it down. The net result was that the
army was ordered to continue Sgt. BenShalom's enlistment without regard to her sexual
orientation.
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High Tech Gays.'27 Both BenShalom and High Tech Gays, however, were
overturned on appeal, 28 thus joining the seventh and the ninth circuits to
the first, tenth, federal and D.C. circuits in giving effect to the Padula
ruling. To make matters worse, even the Ninth Circuit cast some doubt on
the precedential authority of its earlier decision in Watkins when, follow-
ing the release of Justice Norris' opinion, the army successfully peti-
tioned for a rehearing. 29 The Army argued that even if Justice Norris had
been correct in drawing a constitutional distinction between conduct and
orientation, the facts indicated that Watkins' claim fell on the prohibited
side of the constitutional divide: new evidence disclosed that Sgt.
Watkins actually had engaged in "homosexual" conduct. Adopting an
approach reminiscent of the Supreme Court of Canada in Gay Alliance30
and the Federal Court of Appeal in Veysey,13 1 the full court managed to
avoid addressing the central issue of whether the status/behaviour dis-
tinction was well-founded, and held that the army was equitably estopped
from discharging Watkins: having been aware of his admitted "homo-
sexuality" for many years, it would be inequitable to allow the military
to found his dismissal on something which it had condoned for some
fifteen years.
It is difficult to say with any certainty whether the Watkins approach
or the Padula approach will eventually prevail. Although subsequently
127. High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361
(N.D. Cal. 1987) [hereinafter High Tech Gays]. In finding that classifications based on
homosexuality were to be subject to a heightened standard of review, Justice Henderson
distinguished Hardwick not only on the basis that it did not deal with the appropriate standard
of scrutiny to be applied under the Equal Protection Clause to provisions aimed at homosexual
status, but also because it "did not address the issue of all homosexual activity" (ibid. at 1370).
He held that any classification which disadvantages lesbians and gay men because of any
homosexual sexual activity or preference would be subject to a heightened standard of review:
Hardwick does not hold, for example, that two gay people have no right to touch each
other in a way that expresses their affection and love for each other. Nor does Hardwick
address such issues as whether lesbians and gay men have a fundamental right to engage
in homosexual activity such as kissing, holding hands, caressing, or any number of other
sexual acts that do not constitute sodomy under the Georgia statute. Hardwick simply
did not address the issue of discrimination based on sexual orientation or sexual
preference itself. (ibid. at 1370-71)
In the result, he found that the Department of Defense's policy could notpass even the standard
of rational review and enjoined the Department from subjecting the plaintiffs to expanded
investigations, mandatory adjudications or any other procedures based on their sexual
orientation or homosexual activity.
128. Benshalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989) and High Tech Gays v. Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
129. 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
130. Supranote4l.
131. Supra note 79.
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there seems to have been very little unqualified support for the view taken
in the original Watkins decision, at the same time, it is possible to confine
the scope of the decisions of its detractors quite narrowly. InPadula itself,
for instance, Silberman J. noted that it was unnecessary to engage in the
conduct/orientation debate on the facts of that case since Margaret Padula
had openly acknowledged that she had lesbian sex and had no inclination
to refrain from doing so in the future. Since it was completely unnecessary
to determine whether constitutional protection was possible for pure
status claims, the court's remarks in this regard can be regarded as obiter
and unbinding. Much the same can be said of those cases which follow
Padula: in every instance except for BenShalom, sexual conduct on the
part of complainants clearly existed or could be inferred. Unsuccessful
litigants either admitted that they were "practising homosexuals"'132 or
that they were involved in a sexual relationship at the relevant time,133 or
failed or refused to claim that they were celibate. 34 More to the point, I
suppose, a growing number of commentators have argued quite convinc-
ingly that the Padula ruling is plainly wrong, legally speaking. 35 Even so,
it seems unlikely that laws curtailing lesbian and gay sexual expression
are going to be reviewed under a higher standard than simple rationality,
and conversely, that the most lesbian and gay litigants can expect to get
from the constitution is heightened review for status discrimination.
In Canada, of course, there has yet to be any authoritative appellate
pronouncement as to whether the provisions of the Charter embody a
similar guarantee of the right to privacy136 (nor has there been any attempt
to have private sexual acts declared constitutionally protected), 37 and our
equality jurisprudence has not been complicated by the notion that
different types of discrimination should be subject to different levels of
132. High Tech Gays, supra note 127, and Watkins, supra note 118.
133. Todd v. Navarro, supra note 125.
134. BenShalom, supra note 126, and Woodward, supra note 125.
135. As a technical matter, Hardwick should have had an impact on only the fundamental
rights branch of equal protection analysis and not the suspect class branch. See, e.g., T. Prince,
"Webster v. Doe: Toward Constitutional Protection of Gays Against Governmental Discrimi-
nation" (1989) 16 Hastings Const. L.Q. 639; C. Sunstein, "Sexual Orientation and the
Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection" (1988)
55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1161; T. Rich, "Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Wake of Bowers
v. Hardwick' (1988) 22 Ga. L. Rev. 773.
136. The opportunity aroseinR. v. Morgentaler(1988), 37 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.), but with
the exception of Wilson J., the Court declined to take advantage of it.
137. But seeR. v.LeBeau (1988), 41 C.C.C. (3d) 163 (Ont. C.A.) (offence ofgross indecency
does not unconstitutionally restrict freedom of expression).
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review."' Apart from these juridical differences, and despite the fact that
the specific discourse of "orientation" or "conduct" has not yet been
deployed by judges, there are indications, sometimes subtle but at other
times quite overt, that the same tension about the meaning and social
status of "homosexual" sexuality marks Canadian case law.
For instance, criminal law regulation of "homosexuality" "activity"
played a crucial role in Mr. Wilson's fight against the University of
Saskatchewan. 39 There, the issue was whether it was acceptable to permit
an admitted-indeed militant-"homosexual" into the public schools to
teach. Perhaps because Mr. Wilson's claim raised the stereotypical
spectre of "homosexual" child molestation, Johnson J. thought it appro-
priate to discuss the relevance of the Criminal Code. He suggested that,
because the Trudeau amendments1 40 merely carved out an exception to
what was otherwise per se criminal activity, there could be no human
rights protection for lesbians and gays:
It is also noteworthy that in recent years the public attitude to homosexu-
ality and lesbianism has undergone a marked change. It is a far cry from
the days of Oscar Wilde. The Criminal Code ... has been amended to
permit homosexual activities between consenting adults. If the Legislature
had intended the word "sex".. . to cover homosexuality or lesbianism, it
ought to have said so in express language, and its failure to do so confirms
my view that it did not so intend.14 '
Although not always as explicit, the fact that "homosexual" sexuality
was punishable under federal penal law was also a central point of
contention in the Gay Alliance case. Indeed, it was over the relevance of
such crimes that the disagreement between those who allowed GATE's
claim and those who denied that "homosexuals" were at all entitled to
seek legal relief from acts of discrimination took shape.
The Board of Inquiry characterized the issue before it as one involving
a tension between "values." On the one hand, it accepted the importance
of ensuring the protection of "those basic concepts of decency and
propriety" which are fundamental to "a civilized way of life." Equally
vital to the mature community, however, was the protection of citizens
whose "difference" attracted acts of discrimination fostered by pre-
138. Of course, the very considerations that go into determining the appropriate standard of
review under the American Bill of Rights simply enter into the Canadian constitutional
calculus at a different location in the analysis, namely, under the application of section one of
the Charter.
139. University of Saskatcheivan, supra note 11.
140. The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1968-69, S.C. 1968-69, c. 38, s. 7.
141. [197613 W.W.R. 385 at 389-90. This passagewas quotedwith approvalin Vogel, supra
note 17 at D/1658.
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conceived and unreasonable "suspicion, fear, intolerance or hatred." 4'
Those values came into conflict, presumably, when what defined differ-
ence was indecency. To avoid such a clash, the Board drew the following
distinction:
Acceptance of people for what they are does not require that society at the
same time encourage or promote homosexuality or convert those who are
not naturally so inclined. To recognize and respect the beliefs or practices
of others without necessarily agreeing or sympathizing with them is to
show the sort of tolerance that is the mark of a truly civilized and mature
society.
So it is that we can safely conclude that the acceptable standard of
decency which we wish to maintain is in no way threatened or challenged
by our taking, as a society, a tolerant and mature approach to those
homosexuals who are not breaking the law and who seek only the right to
live normally in society without fear of persecution or discrimination. 43
Having defined the sphere of human rights protection to which
"homosexuals" were entitled in a manner distinctly akin to the reasoning
of Norris J. in Watkins, the Board turned to the particular facts of the case:
there is nothing of an indecent, lascivious, or improper nature contained
anywhere in [the tendered advertisement]. Apart from a general theme of
urging all homosexuals to recognize themselves as a first step towards
greater public acceptance, the publication does not purport to advocate
homosexual activity for all members of society nor does it purport to
counsel heterosexuals to change their way of life. Nothing in the paper
could be considered illegal. Nothing in the paper advocates nor counsels
the commission of an illegal act by any person.144
Like Silberman J. in Padula, the majority of the Court of Appeal felt
that the fact that "homosexuals" engage in criminal acts was determina-
tive of GATE's claim. In the words of Branca J.A., there were good and
reasonable grounds why "homosexuals" are discriminated against:
One may well consider that the Criminal Code [ss. 157 and 158] of our
country defines the commission of an act of gross indecency by one person
with another, as a crime punishable with imprisonment.... One, too, may
well consider that under our ImmigrationAct... homosexuals are classed
as undesirables, together with prostitutes and persons living on the avails
of prostitution and pimps, all of whom are within the prohibited classes. If
one bases a bias against homosexuals because they are persons who
engage in unnatural sexual activity which may make them guilty of a
serious crime in certain circumstances and because they are forbidden
entry into Canada as undesireables, can one say that such a bias, if it is
arrived at for those reasons, is unreasonable? I would not think so.14 1
142. Re Vancouver Sun and Gay Alliance Toward Equality, supra note 35 at 498.
143. Ibid. [emphasis added].
144. IbiL at 502.
145. Ibid. at 494-95.
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Whereas the Board of Inquiry, by stressing the fact that not all
activities engaged in by "homosexuals" are unlawful, implicitly relied
upon various legal prohibitions or regulations of "homosexuality" to
establish the outer boundaries of human rights protection of lesbians and
gays, Branca J.A. explicitly invoked these same provisions to support his
view that discrimination against "homosexuals," irrespective of the
context in which the discrimination took place, was reasonable, justifi-
able and legal, so long as "honestly entertained."' 46 Thus for him, it was
neither bigoted nor discriminatory for the Vancouver Sun to refuse to
publish GATE's ad: anti-discrimination law was never intended to place
"criminal perverts" on apar with others who unfairly suffered at thehands
of the irrational majority.
Parting company with his colleagues, Seaton J.A. held that the fact of
public law regulation of "homosexuals" and their activities was com-
pletely beside the point. Invoking the special nature of human rights
statutes (foreshadowing the characterization of such legislation as quasi-
constitutional by the Supreme Court in the years that followed 47) it was
his view that statutory law outside the human rights context was not
relevant to the determination of human rights issues:
The policies behind federal statutes governing immigration are not indica-
tive of the policies exemplified in provincial human rights legislation.
Indeed, for many years Canadian immigration policies were based on
types of discrimination that the Human Rights Code rejects. Nor is the
Criminal Code of help to the appellant's case. The amendments of recent
years have quite changed the law respecting acts which the appellant
suggests are committed by homosexuals. 4
Although in its decision th& Supreme Court of Canada focused on a
different aspect of the appeal, the relevance of "homosexuality" also
factored in the reasoning of both Laskin C.J. in dissent and Martland J. for
the majority. 149 Although he would have upheld the Board's decision, the
Chief Justice framed his otherwise sympathetic analysis with a statement
of facts suggesting that his tolerance, like that of the Tribunal, was
qualified. He emphasized that GATE, "an association of homosexuals,
men and women, whose main object is to protect the societal and legal
146. Ibid. at 495. He distinguished "honest" bias from that derived from "base views" or
based on "spite, malice or bad faith."
147. See Insurance Corp. of British Columbia v. Heerspink, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 145; Ontario
Human Rights Commission v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536; Canadian National
Railway Co. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114; and
Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 84.
148. Supra note 35 at 503.
149. Supra note 41.
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interests of its members and to advance their claim to equality of
treatment with all other members of society,""15 was a lawful association
and that the content of the advertisement which it sought to place was in
no way illegal. What the Chief Justice intended to convey in making this
distinction is not exactly clear, although one would imagine that, having
read the reasons of the adjudicators below, he too was concerned with the
undoing of the criminal law by extending human rights too far.
Recalling that the majority saw the real issue as one of freedom of
expression, one can be forgiven for wondering why Martland J. et alia did
not acknowledge that the speech rights of the Gay Alliance were also at
issue. A brief passage from the judgment suggests that GATE's ad was
envisioned as an act, not as expression, or at the very least as the kind of
expression which public law will not protect. According to him, the ad
promoted subscriptions to Gay Tide; Gay Tide propagated the views of
GATE; and GATE's purpose was "to establish recognition for the thesis
that homosexuality is a valid and legitimate form of human sexual and
emotional expression in no way harmful to society or the individual and
completely on a par with heterosexuality." '
That anti-discrimination law could protect "homosexuals" who were
not breaking the law or otherwise thrusting their sexuality on the
otherwise tolerant heterosexual majority was equally evident in
L'Association A.D.G.Q. 5 2 Although Beauregard J. appreciated that "ho-
mosexuality" was a practice condemned by the highest authorities of the
Catholic Church-an attitude with which he sympathized 53-he con-
cluded that sinceneitherthe group' s activities northe School Commission's
complaint were conduct-based, the claim should be allowed. The Com-
mission could not take advantage of the Quebec Charter's exemption for
non-profit, religious or education institutions:
In the present case, respondent has decided to offer the general public the
rental of its buildings. Respondent has even granted leases to non-Catholic
churches and atheist or agnostic political parties. On the fringes of this
more or less commercial practice I see no connection between the
respondent's religious or educational character and its decision to exclude
the petitioner association as a lessee on account of the ideas which this
group advances. 154
150. Ibid. at 580.
151. Ibid. at 586-87.
152. Supra note 78.
153. Ibid. at 234.
154. Ibid. at 233.
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In keeping with some American authority that simple expressions of
"homosexual" identification are protected, 15 5 the court allowed the claim
but signalled that the scope of protection might prove very narrow indeed.
By placing such a heavy emphasis on the fact that all the Association
sought to do was to get together and talk, the court conveyed a distinct
impression that non-verbal activities (dancing, public displays of affec-
tion, parenting, sex) would not be protected under the Charter, the
purported illegality of sexual orientation discrimination notwithstand-
ing.
Efforts to secure spousal benefits (or their equivalent) have, in recent
years, become the mainstay of lesbian and gay litigation. Although a
small but significant number of these attempts to secure equal employ-
ment benefits have met with some success, most such claims have been
rejected. 156 Of course, concerns regarding the role of family in reproduc-
tion and in the transmission of cultural values undoubtedly play some part
in the denial of such claims, as does simple resistance to the idea that
"homosexual" unions are no different in substance from traditional
heterosexual pairings. But because the possibility or existence of a sexual
relationship has long been acknowledged as a central element of the
spousal relationship, 157 spousal claims can also be conceptualized around
sexuality. Indeed, the point was conceded by an expert witness in
155. See GayActivistsAlliance v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 638 P.2d
1116 (Okla. 1981);Aumillerv. University ofDelaware,434F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977); and
J. G6mez, "The Public Expression of Lesbian/Gay Personhood as Protected Speech" (1983)
I Law & Ineq. 121. See contra Sinn v. Daily Nebraskan, 638 F. Supp. 143 (D. Neb. 1986);
Pruittv. Cheney, 943 F.2d 989 (9th Cir. 1991) [hereinafterPruitt]; and benShalomv. Secretary
oftheArmy, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980), aff'd on othergrounds (sub nom. Ben-Shalom
v. Secretary ofArmy) 826 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 1987). For a critique of the BenShalom decision
see G. Caldwell, "The Seventh Circuit in Ben-Shalom v. Marsh: Equating Speech with
Conduct" (1991) 24 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 421.
156. For American examples of this trend, see Hinman v. Department of PersonnelAdmin-
istration, 213 Cal.Rptr. 410 (Ct. App. 1985); Phillips, supra note 97; Adams v. Howerton, 673
F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982); MatterofEstate ofCooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684 (Sur. Ct. 1990); Beaty
v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 (Ct. App. 1992) and Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
157. See, e.g., Corbettv. Corbett, [1970] 2W.L.R. 1306 at 1324: "[S]exis clearly an essential
determinant of the relationship called marriage." Also see Gajamugan v. Gajamugan (1979),
10 R.F.L. (2d) 280 (Ont. H.C.J.) (incapacity to consummate due to psychological revulsion at
prospect of having sex with wife adequate grounds for annulment). But see Norman v. Norman
(1979), 9 R.F.L. (2d) 345 (Ont. U.F.C.) (impotence on part of husband not adequate grounds
for annulment where wife entered marriage for purposes of companionship). See also the cases
cited in B. Hovius, Family Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 61-62.
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Andrews v. Ontario (Minister of Health).158 To the extent, then, that a
claim for recognition of spousal status requires the implicit recognition
and condonation of spousal conduct (i.e., sex), these challenges do not,
by and large, succeed because they amount to demands for validation of
the unacceptable and intolerable part of "homosexual" existence. They
are not, to put it another way, orientation or status claims.
It is true that some such spousal claims have met with success in the
courts and before tribunals, but of those that have, none has actually gone
as far as to assert fully and without qualification that lesbian and gay
couples are on a legal par with heterosexual ones.15 9 In Timothy Veysey's
case,16 it is noteworthy that he did not attempt to describe his relationship
with Mr. Beu as familial or spousal. Drawing on the correctional
authority's description of the visiting programme,161 which noted that the
purpose of the programme was to foster "the maintenance of family ties
and the preparation of inmates for their return to life in the community
outside the penitentiaries," 161 Veysey argued that, to the extent that the
programme was only available to families, the programme itself discrimi-
nated on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of section 15 of the
Charter.
The trial court as well as the Court of Appeal underscored the point that
Veysey' s position was not that his relationship with Mr. Beu was spousal,
but that there was no good reason why the visiting programme, given its
purpose, should have been limited to inmates in spousal relationships. In
other words, because there was no connection between the goals of the
programme and limiting its availability to persons in heterosexual rela-
tionships, the programme discriminated against "homosexuals" in viola-
tion of the constitutional guarantee of equality. By framing his case this
158. Supra note 62. On this point, see D. Herman, "Are We Family?: Lesbian Rights and
Women's Liberation" (1989) 28 Osgoode Hall L.J. 789 at 798. See also R. Eblin, "Domestic
Partnership Recognition in the Workplace: Equitable Employee Benefits for Gay Couples (and
Others)" (1990) 51 Ohio St. L.J. 1067 at 1069, and A. Friedman, "The Necessity for State
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage: Constitutional Requirements and Evolving Notions of
Family" (1988) 3 Berkeley Women's L.J. 134.
159. I have already registered my concern with the Knodel case, supra note 82. 1 do not think
it necessary to adopt a contrived reading of the case in order to make it fit my thesis, especially
since it remains a legal anomaly. Nonetheless, I maintain that it fits the pattern that "orienta-
tion" cases succeed while conduct claims do not because, insofar as the plaintiff's lover, Mr.
Garneau, had passed away, the claim was essentially an abstract status plea for recognition of
a relationship that was in many important respects, no more.
160. Supra note 79.
161. Established pursuant to section 27 of the Penitentiary Service Regulations, C.R.C., c.
1251.
162. 29 F.T.R. 74 at 75.
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way, Veysey avoided any contentious equation between heterosexual
and "homosexual" relationships and hence any claim that gay sexuality
was on a par with heterosexual sexuality. Consequently, there was no
need to probe the intimate details of Veysey's and Beu's life together. In
contrast to other spousal claims, the two court decisions in Veysey
emphasize only that the partnership was Veysey's "most supportive
relationship."'63 This was the only real fact of relevance in the circum-
stances, given that the root purpose of the programme was to smooth an
inmate's re-integration into the community upon release. Veysey's de-
emphasis of sexuality made possible his victory, such as it was.164
Viewed through the lens of the American experience, Canadian cases
seem to map the controversy over whether "homosexuals" should be
entitled to legal protection against discrimination, and if so, to what
extent. With the addition of sexual orientation as a prohibited head of
discrimination under human rights law and its recognition as an analo-
gous ground under the Charter, the Padula rationale has become virtually
untenable, and the debate over whether "homosexuals" are at all deserv-
ing of equality rights seems at last to have come to a close. These reforms
have not, however, dislodged the ideological substrate of dominant
thinking about lesbians and gays and their place in society. Whatever
society might think about "homosexuals" who self-present as no different
in any meaningful respect from heterosexuals, sexuality is a different
matter.
Admittedly, this "sexuated" reading of the case law is but one of
several possible ways of conceptualizing the jurisprudence. Even so, I
maintain that it is a very useful way of interpreting how and why the courts
deal with lesbian and gay equality claims as they do. It is simply not the
case, for instance, that the state of equal protection doctrine in the United
States is a product of the Hardwick decision: Fourteenth Amendment
equality cases predating the Supreme Court's decision exhibit the very
same antipathy toward the "sex" issue.165 Similarly, concerns about
"homosexual conduct" are beginning to appear in American decisions
under non-federal instruments 6 6 which specifically prohibit sexual ori-
163. Ibid.
164. See my discussion of the legal limitations of Veysey, text accompanying notes 84-87.
165. See, e.g., National Gay Task Force, supra note 111; Bakery. Wade, supra note 112, and
Gay Activists Alliance v. Lomenzo, 320 N.Y.S.2d 994 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
166. For a listing of'such American state and municipal instruments, see B. Case, "Repealable
Rights: Municipal Civil Rights Protection for Lesbians and Gays" (1989) 7 Law & Ineq. 441.
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entation discrimination, 67 and in current efforts to prevent the passage of
such measures or to have them repealed. 168 The very same divisions
between status and act can be seen in other contexts. For instance, in 1982,
before most of the cases I have reviewed were launched, Professor
Douglas Schmeiser wrote that there is a legitimate distinction to be drawn
between "sexual orientation and activity," and that as the sexual activities
of heterosexuals are sometimes curtailed, "it would be remarkable if the
law would give greater protection to homosexual behaviour than to
heterosexual."'169 Similarly, published accounts of the legislative reform
process in Ontario 70 and Massachusetts, 7' reveal that legislatures, like
courts, are preoccupied with the problem of "homosexual" sex. The
debates evidence concern whether anti-discrimination protections could
be misconstrued as condoning rather than simply tolerating "homosexu-
als" generally (and thus as encouraging the disintegration of the nuclear
family and concomitantly an increase in the number of "homosexuals"),
and insulating child molestation and the spread of AIDS from legal
167. Two cases decided pursuant to the Minneapolis Municipal Ordinance prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of "sexual preference" exhibit this trend. In Blanding v. Sports &
Health Club, Inc., 373 N.W.2d 784 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) a gay man was expelled from an
exercise club, ostensibly for engaging in offensive conduct. Rejecting the club owners'
contentions that the plaintiff had engaged in explicit sexual misconduct, or that his actions were
"effeminate and done in an obviously homosexual manner," the court concluded the
"[h]omosexuals must have the same right to do a quick, impulsive dance step in a public place
as other members of society" (ibid. at 788). See also Potter v. LaSalle Court Sports & Health
Club, 384 N.W.2d 873 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1986), similarly finding that the plaintiff had not
engaged in "conduct" of any sort and holding that "[a) right to converse with another in a public
place should not and cannotbe predicated solely upon an individual's sexual orientation" (ibid.
at 876).
168. Attempts to roll back or pre-empt protection for lesbians and gays through the use of
referenda or ballot initiatives have been the subject of litigation in Colorado, Oregon,
Massachusetts and California. See, for example, CitizensforResponsibleBehaviorv. Superior
Court, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 648 (Ct. App. 1992) [hereinafter Citizens for Responsible Behavior];
American CivilLiberties Union of Oregon, Inc. v. Roberts, 752P.2d 1215 (Or. Sup. Ct. 1988);
City of Takoma Parkv. Citizensfor Decent Government, 483 A.2d 348 (Md. Ct. App. 1984);
Collins v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 556 N.E.2d 348 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1990); and Baker
v. Keisling, 822 P.2d 1162 (Or. Sup. Ct. 1991). In Citizens for Responsible Behavior, for
example, the initiative accused the Mayor and City Council of Riverside of using the word
"sexual orientation" to disguise the question whetherhomosexual conduct should be protected.
169. D.A. Schmeiser, "The Problems of Human Rights Activity and the Challenges of the
1980s" in G.L. Gall, ed., CivilLiberties in Canada: Entering the 1980s (Toronto: Butterworths,
1982) 96 at 106.
170. For an account of the Ontario process, see B. Ross, "Sexual Dis/Orientation or Playing
House: To Be Or Not To Be Coded Human" in Stone, supra note 155, 133.
171. For an account of the process in Massachusetts, see P. Cicchino et aL, "Sex, Lies and
Civil Rights: A Critical History of the Massachusetts Gay Civil Rights Bill" (1991) 26 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 549.
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proscription in particular. But perhaps most tellingly, the bifurcation
between acts and status has long been part of social-not just legal-
discourse about "homosexuality." It can be seen, to cite one example, in
the ordination debates, where the question has been framed as whether so-
called non-practising "homosexuals" should be permitted to become
ministers.
172
IV. A Way Forward: Toward a Jurisprudence of Power
Placed within its historical context, the effort to achieve statutory reform
indeed made a great deal of intuitive sense: once the possibility that other
extant guarantees, such as "sex" and "marital status," might be inter-
preted to protect lesbians and gays against discrimination was foreclosed,
it was rational to assume that the enumeration of "sexual orientation" as
a proscribed ground of discrimination in the Canadian Human RightsAct
and other like statutes would offer lesbians and gays the legal protection
they so obviously lacked and so desperately needed. The lobby to secure
the enumeration of "sexual orientation" as an explicitly prohibited
ground of discrimination in Canadian human rights instruments emerged,
then, as the strategy of choice in the struggle for lesbian and gay legal
equality.
If proponents of legal reform began to cast their claims to equality in
the very terms law established for them, they are not necessarily to be
criticized, from the vantage that the present provides, for having done so.
Foucault himself recognized that, even if sexual identity was produced in
and through discourse, it was possible for sexuality itself to "speak in its
own behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or 'naturality' be acknowl-
edged, often in the same vocabulary, using the same categories by which
it was medically disqualified."17 Indeed, it was his view that no dis-
172. A brief overview is provided in P. Girard, "Sexual Orientation as a Human Rights Issue
in Canada 1969-1985" (1986) 10 Dalhousie L.J. 267 at 278.
173. Foucault, supra note 3 at 101. Much the same position on the logic of social transfor-
mation has been articulated, in the legal arena, by Professor Crenshaw:
The possibility for... change is created through the very process of legitimation, which
is triggered by crisis. Powerless people can sometimes trigger such a crisis by
challenging an institution internally, that is, by using its own logic against it.
See K. Crenshaw, "Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law" (1988) 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331 at 1367 (footnote omitted).
Crenshaw drew largely on the work of Piven and Cloward in making her argument. They
argued that struggles for emancipation are produced by and challenge the systems which create
those very conditions of inequality which spark resistance. See F.F. Piven & R.A. Cloward,
Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail (New York: Vintage Books,
1977) at 22-25.
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course, including those the self-proclaimed end of which is to disrupt the
prevailing order and effect a redistribution of rights and obligations, lies
beyond the parameters of and unaffected by power. There could be no
pure liberatory or counter-discourse, no unadulterated dominant dis-
course, no clear space within or without the operation of power's terms.174
Confronting power in its modem manifestation implied not only that
revolution of the grand sort was unattainable, but also that liberatory
struggles could not proceed on the basis of static, unmalleable programmes
that assumed an unshifting, rigid power to be reckoned with:
Discourses are tactical elements or blocks operating in the field of force
relations; there can exist different and even contradictory discourses
within the same strategy; they can, on the contrary, circulate without
changing their form from one strategy to another, opposing strategy. We
must not expect the discourses on sex to tell us, above all, what strategy
they derive from, or what moral divisions they accompany, what ideol-
ogy--dominant or dominated-they represent; rather we must question
them on the two levels of their tactical productivity (what reciprocal
effects of power and knowledge they ensure) and their strategical integra-
tion (what conjunction and what force relationship make their utilization
necessary in a given episode of the various confrontations that occur). 75
Insofar as contemporary litigation reveals that the struggle for legal
equality did not end with the enumeration of sexual orientation as a
prohibited ground of discrimination, the movement to secure legislative
amendments now seems a less than sanguine line of contest. Even where
recognition of lesbians and gays as a protected group was formally
secured, adjudicators have construed such protections in a circumscribed
way, and in particular, have read in the proviso that sexual orientation
rights protect not "homosexual conduct," but only "homosexual status."
The enumeration of sexual orientation proved not to be the final chapter
in the chronicle of law's sure movement toward emancipation, not the
happy closure of the narrative of law's progress, but the establishment of
new epistemic terrain for the juridical "scaling"'176 of the "homosexual"
body. The question now is how or whether to strategize within and around
this new legal space into which "the homosexual" has been interned.
174. M. Foucault, "The Subject and Power" in H.L. Dreyfus & P. Rabinow, eds., Michel
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1982) at 208.
175. Foucault, supra note 3 at 101-02.
176. L Young, "The Scaling of Bodies and the Politics of Identity" in I. Young, Justice and
the Politics of Difference" (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) 122.
Lesbians, Gays and the Struggle for Equality Rights
Critical Legal Scholars would, I suppose,177 have no trouble demon-
strating that the judicial construction of sexual orientation equality
guarantees is an easy, perhaps quotidian, illustration of the indeterminate
character of legal rights and of the legitimating function of law and law
reform. 75 But the conclusion drawn from this demonstration-that law
should be "trashed," 179 and engagement with it ceded-seems unsatisfac-
tory, both as a matter of theory and as a matter of practicality. Anti-rights
arguments oftentimes assume a rather romantic posture in relation to
liberatory efforts outside the legal field: law is portrayed as shot through
with power while the province of "politics" is envisioned as somehow
more pure, less corrupt, and therefore the preferred venue in which to
wage social struggle. Largely unacknowledged and untheorized in these
CLS accounts is how power seems also to have contaminated extra-legal
and non-institutional domains. For sexual orientation, as for race, this is
a theoretical gap of no small consequenceY °o As well, the idea that
lesbians and gays should disabuse themselves of the notion that law is a
worthwhile site of contest' and accept that law will inevitably prove
limited and limiting seems, even in utilitarian terms, somewhat of an
indulgence. 182 For a constituency so long denied even the most rudimen-
177. I am somewhat loathe to ascribe aposition to any group, composed as groups are ofmany
different individuals with varying views and politics. That said, I hope that my comments here
do not do a complete injustice to the work of those connected to CLS.
178. See, for example, M. Tushnet, "An Essay on Rights" (1984) 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363.
Tushnet argues that rights are unstable and indeterminate, and that their use tends to reify
experience and impede the advance of progressive social forces. See similarly, P. Gabel, "The
Phenomenology of Rights Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves" (1984) 62
Tex. L. Rev. 1563.
179. See M. Kelman, "Trashing" (1984) 36 Stan. L. Rev. 293.
180. See Crenshaw, supra note 173.
181. The same argument has been made within communities of colour. See, for example,
Crenshaw, supra note 173, and P. Williams, "Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From
Deconstructed Rights" (1987) 22 Harv. C.R.-C.R. L. Rev. 401.
182. The Women's Legal Education and Action Fund conducted community consultations
with lesbians at three different locations in Canada (Vancouver, Toronto and Halifax) in the
late spring and early summer of 1992, one object of which was to discuss and strategize around
the problem of the conduct/orientation distinction. Even after having been presented with
evidence that "sexual orientation" had not been interpreted broadly, some participants were
nonetheless of the view that the pursuit of equality in the courts on sexual orientation grounds
should remain the pre-eminent strategy. They took this position because they believed that,
given the long history of denying even formal recognition of lesbian and gay rights, it was
symbolically important to press for and litigate anti-discrimination claims under a specifically
lesbian and gay head.
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tary civil liberties," 3 rights are not so easily relinquished. Whatever its
shortcomings, the enumeration of "sexual orientation" has made possible
legal redress for certain forms of discrimination, redress which was
unavailable before the moment of reform.
The issue, then, is not so much whether to use law but how, 14 and the
claim I would like to make here is that the particular terms in which most
litigants have cast their claims, and in which most commentators have
suggested they do so, have contributed to, perhaps even retrenched, the
183. The point should be underscored that express recognition of the illegality of discrimi-
nation against lesbians and gays was first introduced in one province in 1977, and did not gain
any widespread legislative support until the late 1980s. Seesupra note S. It also bears repeating
that where lobbyists have succeeded in achieving statutory reforms, public groundswell of
support for their repeal has been partly successful. See supra note 168. The indignity of having
been refused such basic legal protections is compounded when one considers as well the
phenomenon of lesbian and gay bashing. The National Gay & Lesbian Task Force Policy
Institute issues annual reports on the nature and extent of anti-lesbian and -gay violence. The
1988 report (Anti-Gay/Lesbian Violence, Victimization & Defamation) indicated that of those
surveyed, 44.2 percent reported that they had been threatened with violence, 27.3 percent had
had objects thrown at them, 19.2 percent had been punched, hit, kicked or beaten, and 9.3
percenthadbeen assaulted with aweapon. See also G.D. Comstock, ViolenceAgainstLesbians
and Gay Men (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); and G.M. Herek & K.T. Berrill,
eds., Hate Crimes: Confronting Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men (Newbury Park,
Calif.: Sage Publications, 1992).
184. Lesbians and gays might well want to reconsider using the terminology of "sexual
orientation" in future efforts to secure statutory protection against discrimination, at least in
those jurisdictions which have so far declined or neglected to enact specific guarantees for
lesbians and gays in their human rights codes. For a sustained argument supporting such an
approach, see D. Majury, "Lesbian Inequality" (unpublished manuscript on file with the
author). Where, however, "sexual orientation" has already been statutorily recognized as a
prohibited ground of discrimination, short of pushing for legislative amendments, the more
pressing matter concerns how to litigate claims under the rubric of existing guarantees in a way
that avoids the barriers to full recognition of equality rights which the courts have so farerected.
How this might be achieved is the question that occupies the remainder of this paper.
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very foundations of law's circumscription of sexual orientation rights. 5'
One might say that the legal and factual positions most litigants have
presented to the courts have effectively ceded the sexual terrain in favour
of securing what benefits law's recognition of "homosexual" orientation
might yield. They are, or attempt to be, in other words, status claims.1 6
At stake in this is not just the limitations of engagement with the legal
calculus, but the conceptual foundations of equality law and its applica-
tion in the sexual setting. As a general matter, most sexual orientation
claims have emphasized that there exists a broad continuum of shared
experience between heterosexuals and "homosexuals." They consist, that
is, in appeals to sameness and denials of difference. These appeals find
expression in various forms, the first of which concerns the conceptual
frame within which equality determinations are made. Under the "simi-
larly situated" test of equality, an excluded group is awarded protection
against discrimination provided it is "like" an included group which has
suffered no deprivation; if it does not resemble the preferred or favoured
group in material respects, there is no obligation to treat it in a similar
way." 7 This model of equality has a substantial pedigree, and has almost
185. Space does not permit me to explore how the circumscription of "homosexual" sex
might be implicated in differences of"homosexual" self-identification across the categories of,
for instance, gender and race. There has been some debate amongst lesbians over how
important sex is to lesbian identity, a debate which was intensified by the publication of
Adrienne Rich's "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence" (1980) 5 Signs 631.
Rich argued for the concept of a "lesbian continuum," on which all women who identified with
women could place themselves. Some complained that the continuum unduly downplayed the
erotic aspect of lesbianism, and in so doing, buttressed dominant de-sexualized imagery of
lesbians. See, for example, C. Bearchell, "Why I Am A Gay Liberationist: Thoughts on Sex,
Freedom, the Family and the State" (1983) 12 R.F.R. 57 and the debates in Love YourEnemy?
The Debate Between Heterosexual Feminism and Political Lesbianism (London: Onlywomen
Press, 1981). Consequently, the legal notion that sex is unrelated to lesbian identity or that
ceding of sexuality as ground for legal struggle is acceptable would in all likelihood be a matter
of serious concern for lesbians for reasons stemming from the difference gender makes to
identification as "homosexual." There is now also an emerging literature on the interaction
between sexual and racial identity that might likewise bear on the soundness of the conduct/
orientation distinction. See, for example, E. Hemphill, ed., Brother To Brother (Boston:
Alyson Publications, 1991); R. Fung, "Looking for My Penis: The Eroticized Asian in Gay
Video Por" in Bad Object-Choices, ed., How Do ILook? (Seattle: Bay Press, 1991) 145; K.
Mercer, "Looking forTrouble" in H. Abelove etal., The Lesbian and Gay StudiesReader (New
York: Routledge, 1993) 350; A. Cornwell, Black Lesbian in White America (Tallahassee, Fla.:
Naiad Press, 1983); and M. Silvera, ed.,Piece ofMyHeart (Toronto: Sister Vision Press, 1991).
186. Many American commentators have actually advocated that litigants follow this precise
path. See, e.g., M. Fink, "Washout on the Road to Equal Protection: Watkins v. U.S. Army"
(1989) 1 Det. C.L. Rev. 243; and A. Leonard, "Watkins v. United States Army and the
Employment Rights of Lesbians and Gay Men" (1989) 40 Lab. L.J. 438.
187. A more thorough enunciation of the similarly situate approach to equality can be found
in the seminal article by J.T. Tussman & J. tenBroek, "The Equal Protection of Laws" (1949)
37 Cal. L. Rev. 341.
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completely dominated North American legal thinking since relations of
inequality became amatter of serious legal concern. In 1988, the Supreme
Court of Canada rejected this Aristotlean approach to equality in favour
of what is sometimes referred to as the dominance or anti-subordination
model.18 Before the Supreme Court effected this shift inAndrews v. Law
Society of British Columbia,89 it was not uncommon for litigants to
phrase their claims in "similarly situated" terms, nor was their tendency
to do so particularly exceptional. What is noteworthy is that even after
equality law underwent what arguably was a transformation of profound
dimensions, many sexual orientation equality claims have continued to
reference sameness as the paragon of equality entitlement.
Of course, reference to the similarly situated test will not be found in
the post-Andrews caselaw, but arguments in the pre-Andrews style seem
not to have lost their allure. In the early 1980s,190 the proscription of
sexual practices and/or their representation, as exemplified in the Body
Politic trials191 and the bath house raids, occupied the lesbian and gay
legal field. Sexual difference in this era figured quite prominently. By the
late 1980s, by contrast, "homosexuals" were portrayed as exhibiting the
qualities of decency, respectability and sexual circumspection; 192 in
short, as a class not decidedly distinct from heterosexuals and wrongfully
stereotyped as sexually odd or different. That the types of cases which
have been brought forward have shifted so markedly in the direction of
spousal or family claims is evidence of this, as is the way those claims
themselves have been framed. It has become, for example, almost de
rigueur to highlight emotional and economic ties over sexual ones, or if
the existence of a sexual relationship is mentioned at all, it is almost
188. See, e.g., R. Colker, "Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race and Equal Protection"
(1986) 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1003.
189. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 [hereinafter Andrews].
190. See R. v. Pisces Health Spa (1981), 63 C.C.C. (2d) 427 (Alta. C.A.); Re Hislop and The
Queen (1983), 43 O.R. (2d) 208 (C.A.); and R. v. Carvalho (1981), (Alta. Prov. Ct.)
[unreported].
191. See R. v. Pink Triangle Press (1979), 45 C.C.C. (2d) 385 (Ont. Prov. Ct.), rev'd (1980),
51 C.C.C. (2d) 485 (Ont. Co. Ct.), aff'd (sub nom. R. v. Popert) 58 C.C.C. (2d) 505 (Ont. C.A.).
192. I should note that the trend may once again be reversing itself. Invoking recent Supreme
Court of Canada precedent in support [R. v. Butler, 1 [1992] S.C.R. 452 (upholding the
constitutionality of the obscenity provisions in the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46,
s. 163(8))], the police recently have seized sexually explicit lesbian and gay magazines such
as On Our Backs from lesbian and gay bookstores, and charged bookstore personnel with
distributing obscene materials. It remains to be seen whether these prosecutions will effect a
shift in the public self-representation of lesbians and gays, away from the "just like you" image
toward a more sexually rebellious one.
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always escorted by the point that it is monogamous in nature.193 Typically,
one learns that the couple has pledged fidelity to one another, engaged in
joint acquisition of material goods, and intertwined their finances.
Consider, for instance, the description of the relationship of the plaintiff
and his deceased lover in Knodel:
They exchanged wedding bands to symbolize their love and commitment
towards each other. Their relationship was both known and supported by
their family members and friends. Mr. Gameau's parents gave them a
vacation in Reno as a gift in 1988. They took vacations together whenever
they could. In 1985, they drove to the United States on a four-day trip. In
1986, they visited Mr. Gamean's parents in Vancouver Island, visited
Long Beach and visited the petitioner's parents in Kamloops. In 1987 and
1988, they travelled to Reno together for one week each time. 194
It would seem that from such descriptions of these rather idyllic relation-
ships the only rational conclusion to be drawn is that but for the fact that
it is two women or two men who comprise the couple, the union is no
different in substance or form from (romanticized) heterosexual ones, 195
and should be protected for that reason.
No less popular have been appeals to etiological accounts of "homo-
sexuality." Sexual orientation, like race or sex, is portrayed as trait
acquired very early in life, perhaps even before birth (through the genetic
complement passed on by the parents to the fetus), and hence beyond the
reach of individual will. Behind the invocation of these theories of origin
lies a notion of fairness: there is a certain inequity, so the argument goes,
in burdening individuals with social disadvantages on the basis of traits
in relation to which they can exercise no meaningful choice or control. An
obsession with difference, with deviation from the norm, seems to be
what drives efforts to fathom how it is that certain individuals do not
evolve naturally into heterosexuals as most do, but somehow develop a
queer sexual inflexion. It would appear to follow, moreover, that ideas of
etiology and notions, not of sameness, but of difference, are inextricably
intertwined. Immutability arguments are, however, also aform of sameness
argument insofar as they attempt to render irrelevant the difference which
193. Mr. Veysey, of course, could make no such claim since he had been imprisoned for
committing a sexual assault.
194. Knodel, supra note 17 at 361.
195. Lest it need be said, the point is not to denigrate these choices, or to suggest that lesbians
and gays who choose to conduct their relationships in this way have somehow sold out.
Nevertheless, I agree with Ruthann Robson [Lesbian (Out)Law: Survival Under the Rule of
Law (Ithaca: Firebrand Books, 1992)] that, to the extent law recognizes and extends its
protections only to lesbians (and gays) who comport themselves according to its standards, law
establishes a division between "good" and "bad" "homosexuals," a division that should be
rejected.
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seems to set "homosexuals" apart. Sexual minorities, like racialized and
gendered minorities-indeed, like heterosexuals of all descriptions-are
"simply born that way" and "cannot help themselves." Not only is it thus
unjust to castigate "homosexuals" when all the will they might muster
would not alter the course nature has chosen for them, but discrimination
against "homosexuals" is predicated on a mistaken notion that, unlike
everyone else, they have elected to be different and are the masters of their
own unfortunate fate. Immutability theories, then, operate a double
gesture, introducing "homosexual" difference and sameness in one
complex movement.
Some critics of the jurisprudence have distanced themselves from at
least certain strains of these litigative strategies, but nonetheless continue
to operate within the sameness and difference bipolar frame. Carl
Stychin, for instance, criticizes proponents of the immutability thesis for
their investment in naturalized notions of identity, notions which fix
identity with a transcendental quality it does not possess and which freeze
the number of different identities qualifying for legal recognition.
196
Similarly, in her deft attempt to tackle the act/status distinction, Janet
Halley acknowledges that "homosexual" and heterosexual identities bear
"real, material importance" but refers to them nonetheless as "rhetorical
196. C. Stychin, "A Postmodern Constitutionalism: Equality Rights, Identity Politics, and the
Canadian National Imagination" (1994) 17 Dalhousie L.J. 61.
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categories" or "facilities"'97 in order to avoid imputation that they spring
full-blown from the natural world. 191
Both Stychin and Halley attempt to deal constructively with the
concept of difference as it figures in struggles for legal emancipation,
although they do so in diametrically opposed ways. For Stychin, libera-
tion (at least of the constitutional variety) lies in a brand of pluralism
where ever proliferating identities received legal recognition. Canada
constitutes fertile ground for this postmodern constitutionalism to grow,
197. J. Halley, "Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers i%
Hardwick" (1993) 79 Va. L. Rev. 1721.
198. Most legal commentators acknowledge that the evidence regarding the immutability of
"homosexuality" is less than conclusive, although most share the view that it is exceedingly
difficult to change. For my purposes, this distinction is without meaningful consequence. See,
e.g., J. Jefferson, "Gay Rights and the Charter" (1985) 43 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 70 at 83: "Whether
homosexuality is an immutable characteristic is debatable.... [C]ommon sense makes one
wonder why anyone would choose to adopt a life style traditionally abhorred and widely
reviled." See also Leopold & King, supra note 54. For American commentary adopting
essentially the same view, see J.C. Hayes, "The Tradition of Prejudice Versus the Principle of
Equality: Homosexuals and Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny AfterBowers v. Hardwick"
(1990) 31 B.C. L. Rev. 375 at 457,460; Note, "The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation:
Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification" (1985) 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1285 at 1302-03; E.R.
Arriola, "Sexual Identity and the Constitution: Homosexual Persons as a Discrete and Insular
Minority" (1988) 10 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 143 at 154-55; T. Rich, "Sexual Orientation
Discrimination in the Wake of Bowers v. Hardwick" (1988) 22 Ga. L. Rev. 773 at 802; and K.
Lasson, "Civil Liberties for Homosexuals: The Law in Limbo" (1985) 10 U. Dayton L. Rev.
645 at 656. See contra Herman, supra note 158; Ryder, supra note 5; M.A. Coles, "The Case
for Gay Rights" (1989) 9 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 237 at 247-48; R.J. Magnusson, "Civil
Rights and Sexual Deviance: The Public Policy Implications of the Gay Rights Movement"
(1989) 9 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 217 at 224-27; C. Calhoun, "Denaturalizing and
Desexualizing Lesbian and Gay Identity" (1993) 79 Va. L. Rev. 1859; and D.R. Ortiz,
"Creating Controversy: Essentialism and Constructivism and the Politics of Gay Identity"
(1993) 79 Va. L. Rev. 1833.
The notion that the very category "homosexual" is the creature of sociallpolitical/historical
forces, as such having no fixed or transcendent meaning, seems to have been more readily
accepted outside the legal context. See, for example, J. D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual
Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940-1970
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); J. Weeks, Coming Out: Homosexual Politics
in Britain from the Nineteenth Century to the Present (London: Quartet Books, 1977);
Kinsman, supra note 92; L. Faderman, Surpassing the Love of Men (New York: Morrow,
1981); and Foucault, supra note 3. Although my comments here are entirely speculative, I
imagine that the immutability view has won out over the social constructionist view in the legal
setting because it is the dominant view in the scientific community, because people think it
works, and because of the persistence of the idea that immutability has something to do with
entitlement to equality. Additionally, taken to its extreme, the social constructionist view
threatens the very idea that there has always been or should continue to be such a thing as a
lesbian and gay community in need of legal protection. See J. D'Emilio, "Making and
Unmaking Minorities: The Tensions Between Gay Politics and History" (1985-86), 14 N.Y.U.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change 915 at 920-21:
To [prove that we are a minority subject to discrimination] one would at least have to
demonstrate convincingly a history of discrimination. This task is feasible if we restrict
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given the character of its relationship to itself as a nation-state'99 and the
open ended structure of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Indeed, it
would appear to be his view that the decision in Haig,2" acknowledging
sexual orientation as an analogous ground of discrimination under
section 15, exemplifies this promise.20 1
Whereas Stychin would celebrate difference in all its fabulous variety,
emancipation for Halley seems to reside in the calculated obliteration of
difference as a term of constitutional reference. She notes how the
Hardwick°2 Court equivocated on the relationship between act and
identity in its consideration of the constitutionality of Georgia's sodomy
statute. This lack of coherence provided the Court with the necessary
conceptual fluidity to deploy the category "homosexual" differently at
different points in the judgment in the service of homophobic power, but
it also, in her view, revealed the heterosexual subject position to be the
shifting and provisional one it is. This dual instability provides an
occasion and location for "homosexuals" to break the legal bonds which
tether them to an identity despised for its difference. She suggests, in
short, that sexual minorities should disengage with difference and forge
an alliance with heterosexuals along the axis of acts.
ourselves to the last generation.... A minority must exist before it can be oppressed,
but a socially-defined, self-conscious homosexual minority simply does not exist very
far back in the nation's past.... [C]entral to the oppression of lesbians and gay men,
and to society's ability to shape and enforce it, are the homosexual and heterosexual
categories themselves. The identity and the oppression are bound together. It is not
deeply ironic and troubling that a strategy which relies on civil rights laws is a strategy
which strengthens the categories that allow a system of oppression to continue?
See similarly, A.B. Goldstein, "History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for
the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Harwiclk' (1988) 97 Yale L.J. 1073 (arguing that the
Supreme Court was mistaken when it held that there were ancient prohibitions against
homosexuals).
199. Stychin, supra note 196 at 67:
Postmodern national identity has a particular relevance to Canadian nationalism. The
success of Canada as a postmodem state is tied to its failure as a "modem" nation.
From this provisionality in the Canadian identity there may be found within the fabric
of Canadian life a greater willingness to incorporate new social movements and
identities in terms of national citizenship.
200. Supra note 81.
201. Supra note 196 at71:
The general approach adopted by the courts and its specific application to discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation suggests a willingness to recognize emergent
identities within constitutional discourse and to protect those who so identify them-
selves through the equality guarantees of the Charter.
202. Supra note 107.
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To the extent that available decisional law can be regarded as good
evidence, it would appear not only that the courts conceptualize sexual
orientation claims in terms of the sameness/difference paradigm, but also
that such notions of similarity and dissimilarity are intricately bound up
with the doing/being distinction created by them. Similarity exists, if at
all, only insofar as the desire to commit acts is never acted upon; only, that
is, in the register of orientation. Difference of the problematic, relevant
kind is the desire that cannot be contained and erupts into "conduct."
What marks "homosexuals" as "homosexual," as creatures distinct from
heterosexuals, is their engagement in same-sex sexual practices. Deeply
embedded within law's vivisection of "homosexual" bodies into the
things they want and the things they do, the sameness/difference model
has proved resistant to attempts to deploy it strategically.
Assertions that "homosexuals" are just like "heterosexuals," for in-
stance, whether supported by a substantial body of factual evidence, cast
in the legal terminology of similarity of situation, or buttressed by
scientific study into origins and causes, are typically summarily dis-
missed. Emotional commitment, sexual fidelity, and financial inter-
dependence does not a family make: for all the talk of wills, insurance
policies, and vacations, judges by and large have been unwilling to
characterize lesbian or gay couples as "family" or "spouses" like hetero-
sexual couples. So too, the courts have almost without exception rejected
claims that "homosexuals" are similarly situated to heterosexuals, and
usually in tones which suggest that the divide between these two groups
is so self-evident as to be a matter of common sense.2° Even when
couched in terms of nonvolitional preference, sameness arguments have
not garnered much judicial sympathy or support. Although some courts
have embraced the immutability thesis advanced by litigators, 214 most
judges insist that the evidence is less than clear that "homosexuality" is
fixed at birth or at an early age,205 implying that "homosexuals" could
203. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 62 at 263: "Homosexual couples are not similarly situated
to heterosexual couples. Heterosexual couples procreate and raise children. They marry or are
potential marriage partners and most importantly they have legal obligations to support for
their children whether born in wedlock or out and for their spouses" (emphasis in original).
204. See University of Saskatchewan, supra note 11, and the trial decision in Veysey, supra
note 79, as well as the factum filed on behalf of the plaintiff in Andrews, supra note 62. For
American cases in which the immutability of homosexuality is endorsed see Rich, supra note
112; Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982); Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543
(D. Kan. 1991); Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991); Gay Rights Coalition v.
Georgetown University, 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. App. 1987); and High Tech Gays v. Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1990).
205. State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986); High Tech Gays, supra note 127; and
Woodward v. United States, supra note 125.
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change were the spirit a measure more willing and the flesh not quite so
weak. Indeed, if there have been instances where the courts have lent
sexual orientation discrimination claims their full due, they have been
occasions where the traces of "homosexual" difference raised by such
claims were so fine as to be virtually non-existent. Suits involving de-
contextualized abstract pleas for legal protection,0 6 or complaints of so-
called reverse discrimination launched by spumed heterosexuals, 2 7 for
example, seem to fare best.
Judicial denials that "homosexuals" are sufficiently similar to hetero-
sexuals to warrant legal protection are not always so conclusory or
untextured. Simple factual assertions of similarity have not prevented the
courts from forcing difference out of the closet, as it were, requiring sex
to speak its truth, and turning the courtroom into an epistemic space not
unlike the confessional. After Watkins' victory, several American liti-
gants sought to take advantage of the Ninth Circuit's finding that status
claims would be subject to strict scrutiny review. At times, this involved
engaging in procedural maneuvers which, if successful, would prevent
information regarding the litigants' sexual practices from becoming part
of the record. For instance, Dusty Pruitt filed her constitutional challenge
against the Navy before its investigation into her discharge was com-
pleted in the obvious hopes that her case would go forward without there
being any evidence of her having "practised" as a "homosexual. 20
Joseph Steffan tried more or less the same thing when he refused to
answer questions regarding his sexual practices during the deposition
stage of his litigation.209 But sexual "realities" are not so easily concealed.
Joseph Steffan was ordered to answer the military's questions on pain of
having his case dismissed, and when he refused to do so, the court made
good on its threat. Pruitt was forced to put her claim on hold while the
Navy completed its investigation.
206. Haig, supra note 81. To be fair, the decisions of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeal focused on the situation of Joshua Birch. Mr. Birch, who had been a member of the
armed forces for some five years, was informed by his superiors that he would no longerqualify
forpromotions, postings orfurther training when itbecameknown thathe was a "homosexual."
His military career, in other words, was effectively over. Mr. Birch has since committed
suicide.
207. See, for example, Green v. Howard University (reported in Legal Times (19 January
1992) 21) ($140,000 in damages awarded to heterosexual woman fired because she was not a
lesbian). See similarly Jantz, supra note 203, rev'd on different grounds 976 F.2d 623 (10th
Cir. 1992) (married heterosexual man with children denied right to equal protection of laws
when denied job because he was wrongly perceived to be homosexual).
208. Pruitt, supra note 155.
209. Steffan, supra note 125.
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Likewise, the strategic use of etiological theories has been subject to
a perverse judicial inversion. In Watkins,21° sameness (in the form of non-
volitional preference) grounded its holding that "homosexual" status, but
not conduct, deserved the highest level of scrutiny available under the
Equal Protection Clause, but in Padula,211 difference (also in the form of
immutability) grounded its holding that discrimination against "homo-
sexuals" should only be subject to rational review. In the view of the
Padula court, "homosexual" conduct is as beyond conscious control as
"homosexual" orientation. Thus, both conduct/orientation proponents
and its detractors subscribe to etiological accounts of "homosexuality"
that draw on immutability thinking: on the "liberal" view, simply being
queer cannot be helped but acting on it can, while on the latter, being
"homosexual" and doing "homosexual" things are so inextricably inter-
twined that it would be fictive to suggest that the former is amenable to
conscious control but the latter is not. Compassionate courts may hold
that "homosexuals" deserve protection since (alas) they are not able to
control who they turned out to be, but courts inimical to the idea of "gay
rights" may just as easily invoke the notion that because "homosexuals"
have no power to alter their "essence," there can be little place in the
constitutional constellation for them.
Insofar as Professors Stychin and Halley haye formulated theoretical
approaches to litigation in terms of the sameness/difference paradigm,
they have not confronted and cannot avoid the limits which inhere in that
model. Stychin's account of law's embrace of ever proliferating identities
seems to assume that laws plays no constitutive role in molding those
identities even as it admits them within its protective sweep. Conse-
quently, he does not advert to the fact that certain practices of the flesh
remain subject to legal interdiction, that "sexual orientation" has deliv-
ered less protection, as a practical matter, than it seemed to promise.
Halley's formula for change has the advantage of confronting the
difficulty with the circumscription of sexual orientation rights. But it is,
at its core, contradictory and reformist. If the heterosexual/homosexual
division is as deeply embedded within social and political life, indeed
within our very epistemological and ontological structures, as she sug-
gests," 2 it is difficult to image how highlighting the fact that both
heterosexuals and "homosexuals" practise sodomy would be sufficient to
dislodge it. Moreover, her proto-deconstructive move amounts to little
more than an inversion of the very strategy already unsuccessfully
210. Supranote 118.
211. Supra note 113.
212. Supra note 197 at 1723-26.
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attempted in the courts: whereas litigants have pressed for sameness in the
register of being, Halley suggests pressing for sameness in the register of
doing. Hence, instead of challenging sameness/difference as an appropri-
ate and efficacious model by which to determine questions of (in)equality,
positing an essential similarity, either along the plane of orientation, as
most litigants have done, or along the axis of acts as Halley counsels, or
making difference plural and therefore in some sense costless as Stychin
seems to suggest, amount to maneuvers within the very conceptual space
law has mapped out and used in subordinating ways. 213
What seems to be missing from the "laundered image"214 strategy
pursued by litigants, the postmodern constitutionalism advanced by
Stychin, and the reversal of sodomitical reasoning proposed by Halley is
the critical interrogation of why same-sex sex is an anathema. In part,
reliance upon the sameness/difference conceptual frame accounts for this
omission: where entitlement to equality is measured in terms of similar-
ity, dissimilarity merely figures as a conclusion, not a question. The
immutability approach, for example, by purporting to excuse only those
differences which are a product of biological happenstance, never ques-
tions why differences which are not (or not only) subject to conscious
choice are undeserving of legal protection. Likewise, the similarly situate
analysis rests content to assert that "difference" is sufficient to justify
discrimination without ever problematizing the notion of "difference" in
the first place.215
In Andrews, 2 6 the Supreme Court of Canada laid down a framework
for the determination of inequality claims that effected a paradigmatic
shift from the sameness/difference approach that had previously guided
determinations of questions of discrimination, and that continues to
infuse most thinking on sexual orientation equality rights. Openly dis-
tancing itself from American thinking about equality, and in particular,
213. Professor Halley might be forgiven for her uncritical acceptance of the sameness/
difference paradigm, given its entrenchment in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. For an
earlier attempt of hers to use the process-based model of the Equal Protection Clause
productively, see J. Halley, "The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay,
Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity" (1989) 36 UCLA L. Rev. 915.
214. I am indebted to Professor Douglas Sanders of the University of British Columbia for
coining this phrase.
215. The point was put most eloquently by MacKinnon when she said that the "difference
approach misses the fact that hierarchy of power produces real as well as fantasied differences,
differences that are also inequalities" (C.A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1987) at 37).
216. Supra note 189.
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the similarly situated test of equality entitlement,217 the Court opted
instead for a test of equality that took as its central point of reference the
experience of those groups named in the text of section 15 itself.2 18 Later,
in R. v. Turpin,21 9 the Court clarified that it was the mark of legal, social
and political subordination that distinguished those groups for whom the
guarantee of equality was intended and by reference to which- the
existence of discrimination was to be determined.220
In combination,Andrews and Turpin arguably established anew, more
substantive, paradigm for understanding equality21 under which lesbian
and gay discrimination claims might be differently, and perhaps more
productively, framed. The Court's rejection of similarity of situation as
the proper measure of the (in)appropriateness of discriminatory treat-
ment has made both "homosexual" sameness and "homosexual" differ-
ence largely irrelevant to the constitutional equation. It matters not
whether lesbian and gay couples form stable fulfilling unions just like the
ones heterosexuals create together, whether some "homosexuals" see fit
to engage in sex with members of their own sex (irrespective of whether
217. Ibid. at 167: "[Mlere equality of application to similarly situated groups or individuals
does not afford a realistic test for a violation of equality rights." See also McKinney, supra note
93 at 279, per La Forest J.: "I do not believe that the similarly situated test can be applied other
than mechanistically, and I do not believe that it survived Andrews v. Law Society of British
Columbia."
218. Supra note 189 at 173-76.
219. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296.
220. [1989] I S.C.R. 1296 at 1331-32:
[I]t is only by examining the larger context that a court can determine whether
differential treatment results in inequality or whether, contrariwise, it would be
identical treatment which would in the particular context result in inequality or foster
disadvantage. A finding that there is discrimination will, I think, in most but perhaps not
all cases, necessarily entail a search for disadvantage that exists apart from and
independent of the particular legal distinction being challenged.
221. It is not my intention here to describe in any great detail the current state ofconstitutional
equality jurisprudence since it has already been done by others and because it seems a
divergence from the trajectory of my argument. It should be acknowledged, however, that I take
a particularly optimistic view of the potential of section 15, a view which I myself have not
always held wholeheartedly [see M. Eaton, "Comment: Andrews v. Law Society of British
Columbia (1990) 4 C.J.W.L. 276] and with which others will surely disagree. For commentary
on Andrews, see D. Majury, "Equality and Discrimination According to the Supreme Court of
Canada" (1991) 4 CJ.W.L. 407; D.W. Elliott, "CommentonAndrews v. LawSociety ofBritish
Columbia and Section 15(1) of the Charter. the Emperor's New Clothes?" (1989) 35 McGill
L.J. 235; A.F. Bayefsky, "A Case Comment on the First Three Equality Rights Cases Under
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Andrews, Workers' Compensation Reference,
Turpin" (1990) 1 Supreme Court L.R. (2d) 503; M. Gold, "Comment: Andrews v. Law Society
of British Columbia" (1989) 34 McGiUL.J. 1063; W. Black& L. Smith, "Note" (1989) 68 Can.
Bar Rev. 591; and C. Sheppard, "Equality in Context: Judicial Approaches in Canada and the
United States" (1990) 39 U.N.B.L.J. 111.
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their sexual styles map those of heterosexuals), or whether the desires
they conceal or celebrate stem from divine design, hormonal happen-
stance, or conscious choice: at the level of determining entitlement to
equality, these observations and arguments are constitutionally inconse-
quential.
Given that the discourse of "homosexual" sameness and difference has
been so instrumental in the juridical subordination of "homosexuals" as
the undeserving minority, the Andrews rejection of that discourse consti-
tuted a jurisprudential moment of no small importance. But rather than
expelling considerations of sameness and difference from constitutional
equality entirely, Andrews resituated those considerations: the Court
recognized that classification of the different is a mode by which relations
of inequality are produced and reproduced. It is in this sense most
especially that Andrews has made possible a critical evaluation of
"homosexual" inequality because, in recognizing that it is through the
discourse of difference that inequality is put into play and immunized
from critique, it has created the jurisprudential space to analyze "homo-
sexual" sex, not as a site of difference but as a site of dominance. Within
that analysis neither assumed problems with "homosexual" sex nor the
standard objections to it-that it is abnormal, unhealthy, immoral, the
outward symptom of arrested psychic development-suffice to rational-
ize discrimination; grounded as they are in discriminatory notions them-
selves, such rationales serve to reinforce domination.222 If "homosexual"
sex is to remain outside the protective purview of the constitution, the law
now permits lesbians and gays to pose the question just why that is so and
demands that they be provided with a straight, so to speak, answer.
In saying this, I do not mean to suggest that the anti-subordination
paradigm for understanding and determining matters of (in)equality has
been safely ensconced in thejurisprudence and is there for litigants to take
ready advantage. For instance, although "immutability" has yet to be
expressly endorsed by the Supreme Court22 3 as a requirement in making
out claims under section 15, there are some indications that it has become
indirectly injected into the constitutional calculus. Even in some of the
more forward thinking judgments of the Supreme Court released after
222. See the reasons of Wilson and L'Heureux-Dub6 JJ. in McKinney, supra note 93.
223. Of all the members of the Court, Justice La Forest has come closest to articulating
immutability as a requirement. At p. 195 of his opinion in Andrews, supra note 189, he noted:
The characteristic of citizenship is one typically not within the control of the individual
and, in this sense, is immutable. Citizenship is, at least temporarily, a characteristic of
personhood not alterable by conscious action and in some cases not alterable except on
the basis of unacceptable costs.
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Andrews was handed down, hints at a biologistic approach to equality are
discernable.224 Nor do I mean to suggest that making use of the Andrews
emphasis on domination will necessarily avoid the pitfalls associated
with engaging with law as a tool of social transformation. But while the
Court made some disturbing statements within Andrews itself which
seemed to undercut some of its more progressive findings, and although
other decisions released since contain some worrying indications that the
Court either misunderstood or is backtracking from the transformative
shift in equality thinking which that watershed opinion effected, it is
nonetheless true that the case has yet to be explicitly overturned or
qualified. Additionally, that reification of the status quo may always
already be the result in any attempt to use law misapprehends the point:
given that the struggle for civil rights does offer something to the
otherwise legally dispossessed, the limited object of the enterprise is to
minimize the tendency to legitimate conditions of (in)equality.
V. Conclusion
I am under no illusion that making use of the dominance model of equality
rights (ostensibly) accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada will
necessarily cause a paradigmatic shift in the jurisprudence of lesbian and
gay (in)equality; I would not go so far as to assert that "Andrewsizing"
the litigation will necessarily effect a radical transformation of the legal
construction of "homosexuality." 22 Nevertheless, Andrews arguably has
made possible the refiguration of the place of "homosexual" sex in
constitutional discourse and the terms by which it must be addressed, a
refiguration which has profound implications for the way that the
litigation of sexual orientation equality rights might be conducted in
future. The conduct/orientation, doing/being distinction need not be
exploited for the small, albeit admittedly important, protection it has to
offer or accepted as a sound conceptualization of "homosexuality."
Andrews' granting of a jurisprudential licence to problematize the legal
circumscription of "homosexuals" implies that lesbians and gays might
224. For instance, in R. v. Hess, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906 at 928, the Court rejected an equality
challenge to the statutory rape provision of the Criminal Code (R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 146)
on the grounds that the offence could "only be committed by one sex." Forcritical commentary
on this decision, see W. Black & I. Grant, "Equality and Biological Differences" (1990), 79
C.R. (3d) 372.
225. Indeed I believe there are significant limitations embedded within the Andrews analytic
framework, particularly insofar as its ability to deal effectively with interacting inequalities is
concerned.
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re-enter the constitutional arena as sexual rather than split subjects.22 6
More profoundly, I think, the implications of the juridical demonization
of same-sex sexuality for a plural constituency marked by differences of
gender, of race and so on might be made the object of critique. It may be
that the very terminology of "sexual orientation" so embodies the
problems identified in this paper that all the theorizing or strategizing in
the world will prove fruitless to dislodge them. It may be that other
guarantees apart from the promise of equality will turn out to be more
responsive to the conditions, both material and ideological, which now
plague lesbian and gay existence.227 And it may be that the law will offer
no respite and we should get out of the courtroom and, once again, take
to the streets. Yet, until the subordination thesis is seriously engaged-
until, that is, the way in which power operates in relation to "sexual
orientation," to other sites of oppression, and to the intersections between
them is examined-these options cannot be evaluated meaningfully.
226. Patricia Cain is similarly critical of the trend in American litigation to "ignore sex,"
calling it an "absurdity" (P.A. Cain, "Litigating forLesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History"
(1993) 79 Va. L. Rev. 1551 at 1641). Because of the limitations which inhere in Equal
Protection jurisprudence-limitations, it bears repeating, that arguably do not plague section
15 jurisprudence-she suggests that litigants pursue substantive due process claims instead.
227. See, for example, Thomas, supra note 104 at 1435 (analogously arguing with respect to
privacy rights that "against the backdrop of its violent political history, the substance of the
constitutional claim asserted in Hardivick is best viewed as a right to 'corporal integrity,' whose
textual grounding is the Eighth Amendment prohibition against 'cruel and unusual'
punishments.")
